AuthGateBench: Benchmarking LLMs as Authorization Gate
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Automated approval systems let coding agents execute high-risk actions with minimal human oversight by delegating the authorization decision to a classifier, typically a large language model (LLM). Such systems, adopted in tools like Claude Code and Codex, remain vulnerable to failure modes such as scope escalation, where the agent takes actions exceeding what the user authorized. Existing benchmarks focus mainly on malicious requests, evaluating refusal under an implicit policy. We introduce AuthGateBench, the first policy-guided benchmark for authorization gating under benign requests. We implement a novel pipeline where an LLM generates contrast pairs with identical action and trajectory but differing request, flipping the label between block and allow. This allows us to assess whether models reason over context rather than the action alone. We further examine whether auxiliary environment signals can help models make better decisions. The resulting benchmark comprises 1,400 instances spanning five failure modes drawn from real-world Claude Code incidents. Evaluations show accuracy degrades unevenly across failure modes as models over-rely on internal safety alignment, and models still block most actions even when explicitly authorized, revealing unstable rather than deterministic decisions; retrospectively retrieved environment signals, however, substantially improve authorization accuracy.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 22 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Oct 2026.
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22 of 29 references.
Closest ancestors · 9
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Overeager Coding Agents: Measuring Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Tasks18 May
- 2026TraceSafe: A Systematic Assessment of LLM Guardrails on Multi-Step Tool-Calling Trajectories8 Apr
- 2026Measuring the Permission Gate: A Stress-Test Evaluation of Claude Code's Auto Mode4 Apr
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep
Other references · 13
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- 2024OpenHands: An Open Platform for AI Software Developers as Generalist Agentscited by 1,002
- 2023AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Modelscited by 785
- 2019Learning the Difference that Makes a Difference with Counterfactually-Augmented Datacited by 439
- 2024AutoCodeRover: Autonomous Program Improvementcited by 278
- 2024ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stagescited by 82
- 2026MAS-FIRE: Fault Injection and Reliability Evaluation for LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systemscited by 16
- 2026Coding Agents Are Guessing: Measuring Action-Boundary Violations in Underspecified DevOps Instructionscited by 10
- 2025Say What You Mean: Natural Language Access Control with Large Language Models for Internet of Thingscited by 6
- 2025Can LLMs Make (Personalized) Access Control Decisions?cited by 4
- 2026LiSA: Lifelong Safety Adaptation via Conservative Policy Inductioncited by 3
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