Finite-Time Analysis of Q-Value Iteration for General-Sum Stackelberg Games
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Reinforcement learning has been successful both empirically and theoretically in single-agent settings, but extending these results to multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum Markov games remains challenging. This paper studies the convergence of Stackelberg Q-value iteration in two-player general-sum Markov games from a control-theoretic perspective. We introduce a relaxed policy condition tailored to the Stackelberg setting and model the learning dynamics as a switching system. By constructing upper and lower comparison systems, we establish finite-time error bounds for the Q-functions and characterize their convergence properties. Our results provide a novel control-theoretic perspective on Stackelberg learning. Moreover, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper offers the first finite-time convergence guarantees for Q-value iteration in general-sum Markov games under Stackelberg interactions.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 17 of its 39 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Apr 2026.
Builds on
17 of 39 references.
References · 17
- 2019A Theoretical Analysis of Deep Q-Learningcited by 212
- 2020Sample Complexity of Asynchronous Q-Learning: Sharper Analysis and Variance Reductioncited by 93
- 2021When Can We Learn General-Sum Markov Games with a Large Number of Players Sample-Efficiently?cited by 63
- 2021A Lyapunov Theory for Finite-Sample Guarantees of Asynchronous Q-Learning and TD-Learning Variantscited by 57
- 2021Sample-Efficient Learning of Stackelberg Equilibria in General-Sum Gamescited by 40
- 2019Convergence of Learning Dynamics in Stackelberg Gamescited by 28
- 2021Can Reinforcement Learning Find Stackelberg-Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Markov Games with Myopic Followers?cited by 24
- 2022Regret Minimization and Convergence to Equilibria in General-sum Markov Gamescited by 22
- 2021A Discrete-Time Switching System Analysis of Q-learningcited by 16
- 2022On the convergence of policy gradient methods to Nash equilibria in general stochastic gamescited by 13
- 2020Periodic Q-Learningcited by 10
- 2022Learning Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium in General-Sum Multi-Leader-Single-Follower Gamescited by 4
5 more
- 2023Finite-sample Guarantees for Nash Q-learning with Linear Function Approximationcited by 4
- 2023Finite-Time Analysis of Minimax Q-Learning for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games: Switching System Approachcited by 3
- 2024Finite-Time Error Analysis of Soft Q-Learning: Switching System Approachcited by 2
- 2025Finding a Multiple Follower Stackelberg Equilibrium: A Fully First-Order Methodcited by 1
- 2025Learning in Stackelberg Markov Gamescited by 1
Built on by
Not cited yet.