Tracking Capabilities for Safer Agents
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 18 of its 81 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Mar 2026.
Builds on
18 of 81 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2024GuardAgent: Safeguard LLM Agents by a Guard Agent via Knowledge-Enabled Reasoning13 Jun
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries9 Feb
Other references · 16
- 2021Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Codecited by 8,320
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
- 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,642
- 2023Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIscited by 1,332
- 2025τ2-Bench: Evaluating Conversational Agents in a Dual-Control Environmentcited by 627
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandboxcited by 548
- 2021Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributionscited by 431
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agentscited by 288
- 2025The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injectionscited by 129
- 2025MCP Safety Audit: LLMs with the Model Context Protocol Allow Major Security Exploitscited by 63
- 2025SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systemscited by 45
- 2026Towards Verifiably Safe Tool Use for LLM Agentscited by 36
4 more
- 2024GoEX: Perspectives and Designs Towards a Runtime for Autonomous LLM Applicationscited by 23
- 2025Agnostics: Learning to Code in Any Programming Language via Reinforcement with a Universal Learning Environmentcited by 5
- 2025What's in the Box: Ergonomic and Expressive Capture Tracking over Generic Data Structures (Extended Version)cited by 2
- 2020Designing with Static Capabilities and Effects: Use, Mention, and Invariantscited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Agent libOS: A Runtime Substrate for Capability-Controlled Self-Evolving LLM Agentscited by 10
- 2026Explanation-Bound Tool Execution for AI Agents: Server-Verified Action Claims Without Trusting Model Rationalescited by 2
- 2026Formal Semantics for Agentic Tool Protocols: A Process Calculus Approachcited by 0
- 2026Authority Is Not a String: A Capability-Scoped Harness for Prompt-Injection-Resistant Coding Agentscited by 0
- 2026Authority Is Not a String: A Capability-Scoped Harness for Prompt-Injection-Resistant Coding Agents8 Sep 2026
- 2026Explanation-Bound Tool Execution for AI Agents: Server-Verified Action Claims Without Trusting Model Rationales28 Jul 2026
- 2026Agent libOS: A Runtime Substrate for Capability-Controlled Self-Evolving LLM Agents2 Jun 2026
- 2026Formal Semantics for Agentic Tool Protocols: A Process Calculus Approach25 Mar 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Tool Specifications Matter: Uncovering and Mitigating Safety Risks in AI Agents
- 2024Safeguarding AI Agents: Developing and Analyzing Safety Architectures
- 2025AgentGuard: Repurposing Agentic Orchestrator for Safety Evaluation of Tool Orchestration
- 2026AgenTRIM: Tool Risk Mitigation for Agentic AI
- 2026Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract
- 2026Environment Steering: Using Data Flow Control to Improve Agent Utility and Safety
- 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety
- 2026AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents