AgenTRIM: Tool Risk Mitigation for Agentic AI
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results show that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.
Key facts. Cited by 11 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 14 of its 81 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Jan 2026.
Builds on
14 of 81 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026ToolSafe: Enhancing Tool Invocation Safety of LLM-based agents via Proactive Step-level Guardrail and Feedback15 Jan
- 2025IPIGuard: A Novel Tool Dependency Graph-Based Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents21 Aug
- 2025Securing Agentic AI: Threat Modeling and Risk Analysis for Network Monitoring Agentic AI System12 Aug
- 2025AgentArmor: Enforcing Program Analysis on Agent Runtime Trace to Defend Against Prompt Injection2 Aug
- 2025MPMA: Preference Manipulation Attack Against Model Context Protocol16 May
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2025MELON: Provable Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in AI Agents7 Feb
- 2024AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents19 Jun
Other references · 6
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2023Model evaluation for extreme riskscited by 177
- 2024Small LLMs Are Weak Tool Learners: A Multi-LLM Agentcited by 93
- 2024EHRAgent: Code Empowers Large Language Models for Few-shot Complex Tabular Reasoning on Electronic Health Recordscited by 78
- 2025Collaborative Memory: Multi-User Memory Sharing in LLM Agents with Dynamic Access Controlcited by 61
- 2025ToolFuzz -- Automated Agent Tool Testingcited by 18
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 11.
11 papers.
- 2026A Trajectory-Based Safety Audit of Clawdbot (OpenClaw)cited by 16
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Securitycited by 16
- 2026When Lower Privileges Suffice: Investigating Over-Privileged Tool Selection in LLM Agentscited by 13
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 7
- 2026STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systemscited by 3
- 2026ToolSelf: Unifying Task Execution and Self-Reconfiguration via Tool-Driven Emergent Adaptationcited by 1
- 2026Towards an Agent Operating System - Lessons from Classical and Cloud OScited by 1
- 2026Security Risks in Tool-Enabled AI Agents: A Systematic Analysis of Privileged Execution Environmentscited by 0
- 2026Personalization Meets Safety:Mechanisms,Risks,and Mitigations in Personalized LLMscited by 0
- 2026RIFT-Bench: Dynamic Red-teaming For Agentic AI Systemscited by 0
- 2026AgentStripes: An Evidence-Graded Maturity Model for AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026AgentStripes: An Evidence-Graded Maturity Model for AI Agents13 Oct 2026
- 2026Towards an Agent Operating System - Lessons from Classical and Cloud OS27 Jul 2026
- 2026RIFT-Bench: Dynamic Red-teaming For Agentic AI Systems22 Jun 2026
- 2026When Lower Privileges Suffice: Investigating Over-Privileged Tool Selection in LLM Agents18 Jun 2026
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation9 Jun 2026
- 2026Personalization Meets Safety:Mechanisms,Risks,and Mitigations in Personalized LLMs8 Jun 2026
- 2026Security Risks in Tool-Enabled AI Agents: A Systematic Analysis of Privileged Execution Environments10 May 2026
- 2026STARS: Skill-Triggered Audit for Request-Conditioned Invocation Safety in Agent Systems11 Apr 2026
- 2026A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security19 Mar 2026
- 2026A Trajectory-Based Safety Audit of Clawdbot (OpenClaw)16 Feb 2026
- 2026ToolSelf: Unifying Task Execution and Self-Reconfiguration via Tool-Driven Emergent Adaptation8 Feb 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025AgentGuard: Repurposing Agentic Orchestrator for Safety Evaluation of Tool Orchestration
- 2026AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use
- 2026ToolGuardian: Declarative Security for AI Agent-Tool Interactions
- 2026Tool Specifications Matter: Uncovering and Mitigating Safety Risks in AI Agents
- 2026AgentRiskBOM: A Risk-Scoping Security Bill of Materials for Agentic AI Systems
- 2025More Vulnerable than You Think: On the Stability of Tool-Integrated LLM Agents
- 2026Agentao: A Policy-Governed Runtime Harness for Embeddable Tool-Using LLM Agents
- 2026Towards Verifiably Safe Tool Use for LLM Agents