Explanation-Bound Tool Execution for AI Agents: Server-Verified Action Claims Without Trusting Model Rationales
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Abstract (arXiv)
Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales. Such rationales are neither authorization nor reliable introspection. We present Explanation-Bound Tool Execution (EBTE), a claim-carrying mediation layer that converts decision-relevant rationale content into typed action claims and checks them against server-held intent, policy, payload, tool, risk, provenance, and freshness facts. EBTE cannot widen baseline authority: conflicts deny, incomplete or uncertain claims review, and only matching claims remain eligible for governed execution. We formalize this composition under explicit mediation and trusted-fact assumptions and implement a versioned reference profile with minimized audit packets. Across 136 authored conformance scenarios, the full profile matches all specified dispositions, admits none of 96 designated hard contradictions, and passes 232 metamorphic checks. A draft-only reference integration forwards none of 48 authored hard cases under EBTE while preserving all 16 soft-review and 4 aligned draft paths. In a frozen 2026-07-12 exploratory 224-attempt hosted-model record, the historical generation/runner agreement counts are 71/96, 66/96, and 19/32; a zero-call revalidation of the preserved minimized claims under the current pipeline yields 70/96, 65/96, and 17/32. In an AgentDojo-derived semantic check, existing high-risk controls make all 12 attack proposals non-allow, while EBTE resolves the task--proposal contradictions as deny. Together, these studies establish profile conformance and demonstrate the feasibility of server-checked action claims within the evaluated settings.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 22 of its 58 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Jul 2026.
Builds on
22 of 58 references.
References · 22
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10 more
- 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agentscited by 158
- 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 121
- 2026AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocationscited by 38
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- 2026Tracking Capabilities for Safer Agentscited by 4
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.