Basic Legibility Protocols Improve Trusted Monitoring
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
The AI Control research agenda aims to develop control protocols: safety techniques that prevent untrusted AI systems from taking harmful actions during deployment. Because human oversight is expensive, one approach is trusted monitoring, where weaker, trusted models oversee stronger, untrusted modelsunicodex2013but this often fails when the untrusted model's actions exceed the monitor's comprehension. We introduce legibility protocols, which encourage the untrusted model to take actions that are easier for a monitor to evaluate. We perform control evaluations in the APPS coding setting, where an adversarial agent attempts to write backdoored code without detection. We study legibility protocols that allow the untrusted model to thoroughly document its code with commentsunicodex2013in contrast to prior work, which removed comments to prevent deceptive ones. We find that: (i) commenting protocols improve safety without sacrificing task performance relative to comment-removal baselines; (ii) commenting disproportionately benefits honest code, which typically has a natural explanation that resolves monitor suspicion, whereas backdoored code frequently lacks an easy justification; (iii) gains from commenting increase with monitor strength, as stronger monitors better distinguish genuine justifications from only superficially plausible ones.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 18 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2026.
Builds on
18 of 30 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Factor(T,U): Factored Cognition Strengthens Monitoring of Untrusted AI1 Dec
- 2025Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocols10 Oct
- 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion12 Dec
Other references · 15
- 2021Measuring Coding Challenge Competence With APPScited by 879
- 2024RE-Bench: Evaluating frontier AI R&D capabilities of language model agents against human expertscited by 153
- 2025Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Software Taskscited by 142
- 2025GDPval: Evaluating AI Model Performance on Real-World Economically Valuable Taskscited by 142
- 2023Scheming AIs: Will AIs fake alignment during training in order to get power?cited by 90
- 2024Prover-Verifier Games improve legibility of LLM outputscited by 79
- 2025Vending-Bench: A Benchmark for Long-Term Coherence of Autonomous Agentscited by 75
- 2025SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agentscited by 58
- 2025Ctrl-Z: Controlling AI Agents via Resamplingcited by 40
- 2024Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threatscited by 27
- 2025BashArena: A Control Setting for Highly Privileged AI Agentscited by 15
- 2024Subversion Strategy Eval: Can language models statelessly strategize to subvert control protocols?cited by 14
3 more
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.
- 2026Bounded Sovereignty and the Control Tax: Pricing AI Oversight When the Deployer Does Not Own the Model6 Jul 2026
- 2026Honeypot Protocol14 Apr 2026
- 2026Measuring Weak-to-Strong Legibility of Reasoning Models20 Mar 2026