BashArena: A Control Setting for Highly Privileged AI Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Future AI agents might run autonomously with elevated privileges. If these agents are misaligned, they might abuse these privileges to cause serious damage. The field of AI control develops techniques that make it harder for misaligned AIs to cause such damage, while preserving their usefulness. We introduce BashArena, a setting for studying AI control techniques in security-critical environments. BashArena contains 637 Linux system administration and infrastructure engineering tasks in complex, realistic environments, along with four sabotage objectives (execute malware, exfiltrate secrets, escalate privileges, and disable firewall) for a red team to target. We evaluate multiple frontier LLMs on their ability to complete tasks, perform sabotage undetected, and detect sabotage attempts. Claude Sonnet 4.5 successfully executes sabotage while evading monitoring by GPT-4.1 mini 26% of the time, at 4% trajectory-wise FPR. Our findings provide a baseline for designing more effective control protocols in BashArena. We release the dataset as a ControlArena setting and share our task generation pipeline.
Key facts. Cited by 17 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 1 of its 26 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Dec 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 17.
17 papers.
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- 2026LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environmentscited by 8
- 2026Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehaviorcited by 6
- 2026SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitorscited by 6
- 2026MonitoringBench: Semi-Automated Red-Teaming for Agent Monitoringcited by 4
- 2026Training Deliberative Monitors for Black-Box Scheming Detectioncited by 4
- 2026Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?cited by 4
- 2026Basic Legibility Protocols Improve Trusted Monitoringcited by 3
- 2026Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscationcited by 3
- 2026ResearchArena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in Automated AI R&Dcited by 2
- 2026Retrying vs Resampling in AI Controlcited by 1
- 2026Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safetycited by 1
- 2026Bootstrapped Monitoring: Leveraging Transparent Reasoning to Oversee Stronger AI Agentscited by 1
5 more
- 2026Terminal Agents: A Survey of AI Agents in Command-Line Environmentscited by 1
- 2026Honeypot Protocolcited by 0
- 2026Democratizing Agent Deployment Safety: A Structural Monitoring Approachcited by 0
- 2026MOLE: Detecting Insider Threats in AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agentscited by 0
- 2026Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agents17 Sep 2026
- 2026MOLE: Detecting Insider Threats in AI Agents7 Sep 2026
- 2026Terminal Agents: A Survey of AI Agents in Command-Line Environments20 Aug 2026
- 2026ResearchArena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in Automated AI R&D21 Jul 2026
- 2026Democratizing Agent Deployment Safety: A Structural Monitoring Approach16 Jul 2026
- 2026Bootstrapped Monitoring: Leveraging Transparent Reasoning to Oversee Stronger AI Agents10 Jun 2026
- 2026Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?4 Jun 2026
- 2026Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety3 Jun 2026
- 2026Training Deliberative Monitors for Black-Box Scheming Detection28 May 2026
- 2026Retrying vs Resampling in AI Control25 May 2026
- 2026SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitors15 May 2026
- 2026Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation14 May 2026
5 more
- 2026MonitoringBench: Semi-Automated Red-Teaming for Agent Monitoring10 May 2026
- 2026LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environments16 Apr 2026
- 2026Honeypot Protocol14 Apr 2026
- 2026Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior25 Feb 2026
- 2026Basic Legibility Protocols Improve Trusted Monitoring9 Feb 2026
- 2026LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environmentscited by 8
- 2026Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehaviorcited by 6
- 2026SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitorscited by 6
- 2026MonitoringBench: Semi-Automated Red-Teaming for Agent Monitoringcited by 4
- 2026Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?cited by 4
- 2026Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safetycited by 1
- 2026Terminal Agents: A Survey of AI Agents in Command-Line Environmentscited by 1
- 2026Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agentscited by 0
- 2026Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agents17 Sep 2026
- 2026Terminal Agents: A Survey of AI Agents in Command-Line Environments20 Aug 2026
- 2026Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?4 Jun 2026
- 2026Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety3 Jun 2026
- 2026SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitors15 May 2026
- 2026MonitoringBench: Semi-Automated Red-Teaming for Agent Monitoring10 May 2026
- 2026LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environments16 Apr 2026
- 2026Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior25 Feb 2026
- 2026Basic Legibility Protocols Improve Trusted Monitoringcited by 3
- 2026MOLE: Detecting Insider Threats in AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026MOLE: Detecting Insider Threats in AI Agents7 Sep 2026
- 2026Basic Legibility Protocols Improve Trusted Monitoring9 Feb 2026
- 2026Training Deliberative Monitors for Black-Box Scheming Detectioncited by 4
- 2026ResearchArena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in Automated AI R&Dcited by 2
- 2026Retrying vs Resampling in AI Controlcited by 1
- 2026Bootstrapped Monitoring: Leveraging Transparent Reasoning to Oversee Stronger AI Agentscited by 1
- 2026Honeypot Protocolcited by 0
- 2026Democratizing Agent Deployment Safety: A Structural Monitoring Approachcited by 0
- 2026ResearchArena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in Automated AI R&D21 Jul 2026
- 2026Democratizing Agent Deployment Safety: A Structural Monitoring Approach16 Jul 2026
- 2026Bootstrapped Monitoring: Leveraging Transparent Reasoning to Oversee Stronger AI Agents10 Jun 2026
- 2026Training Deliberative Monitors for Black-Box Scheming Detection28 May 2026
- 2026Retrying vs Resampling in AI Control25 May 2026
- 2026Honeypot Protocol14 Apr 2026
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