Bounded Sovereignty and the Control Tax: Pricing AI Oversight When the Deployer Does Not Own the Model
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Abstract (arXiv)
AI control research asks how to deploy models safely even when they may be misaligned, but many control protocols assume that the deployer can instrument the model and its surrounding pipeline. That assumption often fails for regulated organisations using frontier models through APIs or managed endpoints, where the deployer may control the business process but not the model weights, serving infrastructure, internal traces, update process, or full interaction logs. This paper introduces bounded sovereignty: partial technical and contractual access across the data, model, infrastructure, and interaction layers of the AI stack. It argues that these access conditions determine which control protocols can be executed in practice. The paper contributes a four-layer access typology, a protocol-by-layer requirements matrix, and the concept of sovereignty discount cost: the part of the control tax spent substituting for missing access through contracts, architecture, audit, vendor assurance, residual risk, or reduced system scope. It also reports a synthetic access-ablation experiment over 1.35 million synthetic case simulations and interprets the findings through an anonymised national-payments-infrastructure scenario. The experiment is not real-world payment-system evidence; it is a construct-validity exercise. The results show that complete logs improve diagnosis, a pre-execution gateway enables intervention, trace access and model-version control strengthen post-incident explanation, and scope restriction can improve safety while reducing usefulness. Control protocols proposed as general safety solutions should therefore state their access assumptions explicitly.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 17 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Jul 2026.
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17 of 29 references.
References · 17
- 2023Weak-to-Strong Generalization: Eliciting Strong Capabilities With Weak Supervisioncited by 467
- 2018AI safety via debatecited by 400
- 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 229
- 2020Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligencecited by 101
- 2024On scalable oversight with weak LLMs judging strong LLMscited by 99
- 2024Open Problems in Technical AI Governancecited by 49
- 2025Ctrl-Z: Controlling AI Agents via Resamplingcited by 44
- 2025A sketch of an AI control safety casecited by 39
- 2024Games for AI Control: Models of Safety Evaluations of AI Deployment Protocolscited by 31
- 2025Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocolscited by 30
- 2025Scaling Laws For Scalable Oversightcited by 23
- 2023Oversight for Frontier AI through a Know-Your-Customer Scheme for Compute Providerscited by 13
5 more
- 2025Control Tax: The Price of Keeping AI in Checkcited by 10
- 2026When can we trust untrusted monitoring? A safety case sketch across collusion strategiescited by 10
- 2026Attack Selection Reduces Safety in Concentrated AI Control Settings against Trusted Monitoringcited by 6
- 2026Basic Legibility Protocols Improve Trusted Monitoringcited by 3
- 2026AI Infrastructure Sovereigntycited by 1
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