Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective
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Abstract (arXiv)
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least advantaged agent at the end of all rounds (optimal) or at the end of every individual round (anytime optimal). We investigate the computational challenges associated with finding (anytime) optimal outcomes and demonstrate that these problems are generally computationally intractable. However, we provide approximation algorithms, fixed-parameter tractable algorithms, and identify several special cases whereby the problem(s) can be solved efficiently. Along the way, we also establish characterizations of Pareto-optimal/maximum matchings, which may be of independent interest to works in matching theory and house allocation.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 34 of its 81 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Oct 2025.
Builds on
34 of 81 references.
References · 34
- 2017Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuationscited by 22
- 2015Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problemcited by 20
- 2023Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Makingcited by 17
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2020Maximum Nash Welfare and Other Stories About EFXcited by 13
- 2020Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them Allcited by 11
- 2023Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Itemscited by 11
- 2024Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionalitycited by 11
- 2024Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Itemscited by 11
- 2024Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Changecited by 10
- 2019Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goodscited by 9
- 2022Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reductioncited by 9
22 more
- 2025Strengthening Proportionality in Temporal Votingcited by 9
- 2022Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and Efficientlycited by 8
- 2020Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Marketscited by 7
- 2022On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuationscited by 6
- 2025Online Fair Division with Additional Informationcited by 6
- 2025Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chorescited by 6
- 2019Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problemscited by 5
- 2020Uniform Welfare Guarantees Under Identical Subadditive Valuationscited by 5
- 2023Multi-agent Online Scheduling: MMS Allocations for Indivisible Itemscited by 5
- 2019Envy-free Matchings in Bipartite Graphs and their Applications to Fair Divisioncited by 4
- 2022Fair Allocation of Two Types of Chorescited by 4
- 2024Stochastic Bandits for Egalitarian Assignmentcited by 4
- 2025Approximate Proportionality in Online Fair Divisioncited by 4
- 2017Envy-free Matchings with Lower Quotascited by 3
- 2019Fair Division through Information Withholdingcited by 3
- 2022Online Algorithms for the Santa Claus Problemcited by 3
- 2024On the Hardness of Fair Allocation under Ternary Valuationscited by 3
- 2014Combinatorial Algorithm for Restricted Max-Min Fair Allocationcited by 2
- 2018A Tale of Santa Claus, Hypergraphs and Matroidscited by 2
- 2023Santa Claus meets Makespan and Matroids: Algorithms and Reductionscited by 2
- 2024Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chorescited by 2
- 2024Envy-Free House Allocation with Minimum Subsidycited by 2
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
- 2026The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Votingcited by 3
- 2026Online Fair Division with Budget Constraintscited by 0
- 2026Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints25 Jul 2026
- 2026The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting11 May 2026