mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Strengthening Proportionality in Temporal Voting

arXiv 2505.22513 ↗First posted 28 May 2025cs.GT cs.AIcited by 9

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study proportional representation in the framework of temporal voting with approval ballots. Prior work adapted basic proportional representation concepts -- justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), and extended JR (EJR) -- from the multiwinner setting to the temporal setting. Our work introduces and examines ways of going beyond EJR. Specifically, we consider stronger variants of JR, PJR, and EJR, and introduce temporal adaptations of more demanding multiwinner axioms, such as EJR+, full JR (FJR), full proportional JR (FPJR), and the Core. For each of these concepts, we investigate its existence and study its relationship to existing notions, thereby establishing a rich hierarchy of proportionality concepts. Notably, we show that two of our proposed axioms -- EJR+ and FJR -- strengthen EJR while remaining satisfiable in every temporal election.

Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 27 of its 49 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2025.

Builds on

27 of 49 references.

References · 27

  1. 2023Generative Social Choicecited by 43
  2. 2014Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Votingcited by 42
  3. 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
  4. 2020Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilitiescited by 37
  5. 2016Proportional Justified Representationcited by 25
  6. 2021Diverse Auto-Curriculum is Critical for Successful Real-World Multiagent Learning Systemscited by 24
  7. 2023Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Votingcited by 23
  8. 2018Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goodscited by 22
  9. 2016Fair Public Decision Makingcited by 21
  10. 2019Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarismcited by 21
  11. 2023Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Makingcited by 17
  12. 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
15 more
  1. 2024Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionalitycited by 11
  2. 2024Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Itemscited by 11
  3. 2024Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Changecited by 10
  4. 2022Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reductioncited by 9
  5. 2025Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Votingcited by 9
  6. 2019Approval-Based Apportionmentcited by 8
  7. 2020When Votes Change and Committees Should (Not)cited by 7
  8. 2023Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (Over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchaincited by 7
  9. 2020A verifiably secure and proportional committee election rulecited by 6
  10. 2022Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Electionscited by 3
  11. 2023A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Makingcited by 3
  12. 2020Overview of Polkadot and its Design Considerationscited by 2
  13. 2022Using Multiwinner Voting to Search for Moviescited by 2
  14. 2025Representative Ranking for Deliberation in the Public Spherecited by 2
  15. 2022Scheduling Virtual Conferences Fairly: Achieving Equitable Participant and Speaker Satisfactioncited by 1

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 4; 2026: 5.

9 papers.

  1. 2025Online Fair Division with Additional Informationcited by 6
  2. 2025Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chorescited by 6
  3. 2025Approximate Proportionality in Online Fair Divisioncited by 4
  4. 2026The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Votingcited by 3
  5. 2025Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspectivecited by 2
  6. 2026Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computationcited by 1
  7. 2026The End Justifies the Mean: A Linear Ranking Rule for Proportional Sequential Decisionscited by 0
  8. 2026Online Fair Division with Budget Constraintscited by 0
  9. 2026Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting with Ranked Preferencescited by 0