Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness and proportionality) and economic efficiency (such as Pareto-optimality). However, in the real world, items are not always allocated once and for all, but often repeatedly. For example, the items may be recurring chores to distribute in a household. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of the repeated fair division of indivisible goods and chores, and propose a formal model for this scenario. In this paper, we show that, if the number of repetitions is a multiple of the number of agents, there always exists a sequence of allocations that is proportional and Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, irrespective of the number of repetitions, an envy-free and Pareto-optimal sequence of allocations may not exist. For the case of two agents, we show that if the number of repetitions is even, it is always possible to find a sequence of allocations that is overall envy-free and Pareto-optimal. We then prove even stronger fairness guarantees, showing that every allocation in such a sequence satisfies some relaxation of envy-freeness. Finally, in case that the number of repetitions can be chosen freely, we show that envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations are achievable for any number of agents.
Key facts. Cited by 11 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 4 Apr 2023.
Builds on
No reference list yet.
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 1; 2024: 2; 2025: 5; 2026: 3.
11 papers.
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2024Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionalitycited by 11
- 2024Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Itemscited by 11
- 2025Online Fair Division with Additional Informationcited by 6
- 2025Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chorescited by 6
- 2025Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspectivecited by 2
- 2025Resource Allocation under the Latin Square Constraintcited by 1
- 2025Bandit Max-Min Fair Allocationcited by 1
- 2026Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Poolscited by 0
- 2026Temporal Panel Selection in Ongoing Citizens' Assembliescited by 0
- 2026Temporal Fair Division in Multi-Agent Systems: From Precise Alternation Metrics to Scalable Coordination Proxiescited by 0
- 2026Temporal Fair Division in Multi-Agent Systems: From Precise Alternation Metrics to Scalable Coordination Proxies14 May 2026
- 2026Temporal Panel Selection in Ongoing Citizens' Assemblies18 Feb 2026
- 2026Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Pools25 Jan 2026
- 2025Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective6 Oct 2025
- 2025Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores12 Aug 2025
- 2025Online Fair Division with Additional Information30 May 2025
- 2025Bandit Max-Min Fair Allocation8 May 2025
- 2025Resource Allocation under the Latin Square Constraint11 Jan 2025
- 2024Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items18 Oct 2024
- 2024Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality24 Aug 2024
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting7 Dec 2023