On the Undecidability of Artificial Intelligence Alignment: Machines that Halt
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Human values and AI feedback alignment
Abstract (arXiv)
The inner alignment problem, which asserts whether an arbitrary artificial intelligence (AI) model satisfices a non-trivial alignment function of its outputs given its inputs, is undecidable. This is rigorously proved by Rice's theorem, which is also equivalent to a reduction to Turing's Halting Problem, whose proof sketch is presented in this work. Nevertheless, there is an enumerable set of provenly aligned AIs that are constructed from a finite set of provenly aligned operations. Therefore, we argue that the alignment should be a guaranteed property from the AI architecture rather than a characteristic imposed post-hoc on an arbitrary AI model. Furthermore, while the outer alignment problem is the definition of a judge function that captures human values and preferences, we propose that such a function must also impose a halting constraint that guarantees that the AI model always reaches a terminal state in finite execution steps. Our work presents examples and models that illustrate this constraint and the intricate challenges involved, advancing a compelling case for adopting an intrinsically hard-aligned approach to AI systems architectures that ensures halting.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Human values and AI feedback alignment, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 14 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Aug 2024.
Builds on
14 of 22 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2023A Multi-Level Framework for the AI Alignment Problem10 Jan
- 2022In conversation with Artificial Intelligence: aligning language models with human values1 Sep
Other references · 12
- 2018AI safety via debatecited by 384
- 2019Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systemscited by 250
- 2021Goal Misgeneralization in Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 122
- 2016Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligencecited by 74
- 2018Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignmentcited by 60
- 2021What Would Jiminy Cricket Do? Towards Agents That Behave Morallycited by 57
- 2021The Challenge of Value Alignment: from Fairer Algorithms to AI Safetycited by 34
- 2023Natural Selection Favors AIs over Humanscited by 24
- 2018Impossibility and Uncertainty Theorems in AI Value Alignment (or why your AGI should not have a utility function)cited by 22
- 2016Superintelligence cannot be contained: Lessons from Computability Theorycited by 13
- 2021Impossibility Results in AI: A Surveycited by 13
- 2024Fast and Exact Enumeration of Deep Networks Partitions Regionscited by 5
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Intrinsic Barriers and Practical Pathways for Human-AI Alignment: An Agreement-Based Complexity Analysis
- 2026The Unfireable Safety Kernel: Execution-Time AI Alignment for AI Agents and Other Escapable AI Systems
- 2023The Alignment Problem in Context
- 2024The Road to Artificial SuperIntelligence: A Comprehensive Survey of Superalignment
- 2024Possible Principles for Aligned Structure Learning Agents
- 2024The AI Alignment Paradox
- 2023Of Models and Tin Men: A Behavioural Economics Study of Principal-Agent Problems in AI Alignment using Large-Language Models
- 2025Out of Control -- Why Alignment Needs Formal Control Theory (and an Alignment Control Stack)