Mask and Restore: Blind Backdoor Defense at Test Time with Masked Autoencoder
On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks
Abstract (arXiv)
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where an adversary manipulates the model behavior through overlaying images with special triggers. Existing backdoor defense methods often require accessing a few validation data and model parameters, which is impractical in many real-world applications, e.g., when the model is provided as a cloud service. In this paper, we address the practical task of blind backdoor defense at test time, in particular for local attacks and black-box models. The true label of every test image needs to be recovered on the fly from a suspicious model regardless of image benignity. We consider test-time image purification that incapacitates local triggers while keeping semantic contents intact. Due to diverse trigger patterns and sizes, the heuristic trigger search can be unscalable. We circumvent such barrier by leveraging the strong reconstruction power of generative models, and propose Blind Defense with Masked AutoEncoder (BDMAE). BDMAE detects possible local triggers using image structural similarity and label consistency between the test image and MAE restorations. The detection results are then refined by considering trigger topology. Finally, we fuse MAE restorations adaptively into a purified image for making prediction. Extensive experiments under different backdoor settings validate its effectiveness and generalizability.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 43 of its 59 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Mar 2023.
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Other references · 42
- 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 51,809
- 2020An Image is Worth 16x16 Words: Transformers for Image Recognition at Scalecited by 29,915
- 2021Masked Autoencoders Are Scalable Vision Learnerscited by 7,339
- 2016Grad-CAM: Visual Explanations from Deep Networks via Gradient-based Localizationcited by 6,690
- 2013Rich feature hierarchies for accurate object detection and semantic segmentationcited by 2,160
- 2021SimMIM: A Simple Framework for Masked Image Modelingcited by 1,147
- 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,012
- 2017VGGFace2: A dataset for recognising faces across pose and agecited by 911
- 2020Image Segmentation Using Deep Learning: A Surveycited by 659
- 2018Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 550
- 2022Diffusion Models for Adversarial Purificationcited by 469
- 2022Masked Autoencoders for Point Cloud Self-supervised Learningcited by 456
30 more
- 2020Class-incremental learning: survey and performance evaluation on image classificationcited by 446
- 2019STRIP: A Defence Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 437
- 2020Reflection Backdoor: A Natural Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networkscited by 341
- 2020Invisible Backdoor Attack with Sample-Specific Triggerscited by 338
- 2020Input-Aware Dynamic Backdoor Attackcited by 304
- 2022MultiMAE: Multi-modal Multi-task Masked Autoencoderscited by 287
- 2019Label-Consistent Backdoor Attackscited by 285
- 2021Anti-Backdoor Learning: Training Clean Models on Poisoned Datacited by 258
- 2019A new Backdoor Attack in CNNs by training set corruption without label poisoningcited by 237
- 2020Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defensescited by 171
- 2019Salient Object Detection in the Deep Learning Era: An In-Depth Surveycited by 163
- 2021Adversarial Unlearning of Backdoors via Implicit Hypergradientcited by 160
- 2022Backdoor Defense via Decoupling the Training Processcited by 149
- 2020Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems in the Physical Worldcited by 129
- 2020Deep Feature Space Trojan Attack of Neural Networks by Controlled Detoxificationcited by 93
- 2022Guided Diffusion Model for Adversarial Purificationcited by 90
- 2021Backdoor Attack in the Physical Worldcited by 82
- 2022BppAttack: Stealthy and Efficient Trojan Attacks against Deep Neural Networks via Image Quantization and Contrastive Adversarial Learningcited by 82
- 2020DeepSweep: An Evaluation Framework for Mitigating DNN Backdoor Attacks using Data Augmentationcited by 75
- 2021Black-box Detection of Backdoor Attacks with Limited Information and Datacited by 71
- 2021PatchCleanser: Certifiably Robust Defense against Adversarial Patches for Any Image Classifiercited by 63
- 2019Model Agnostic Defence against Backdoor Attacks in Machine Learningcited by 52
- 2021AEVA: Black-box Backdoor Detection Using Adversarial Extreme Value Analysiscited by 52
- 2023Black-box Backdoor Defense via Zero-shot Image Purificationcited by 44
- 2021Few-shot Backdoor Defense Using Shapley Estimationcited by 40
- 2022Training with More Confidence: Mitigating Injected and Natural Backdoors During Trainingcited by 38
- 2021Topological Detection of Trojaned Neural Networkscited by 34
- 2020FaceHack: Triggering backdoored facial recognition systems using facial characteristicscited by 19
- 2022Backdoor Cleansing with Unlabeled Datacited by 17
- 2021TAD: Trigger Approximation based Black-box Trojan Detection for AIcited by 8
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