Is Nash Equilibrium Approximator Learnable?
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution. First, we offer a generalization bound using the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning model. The bound describes the gap between the expected loss and empirical loss of the NE approximator. Afterward, we prove the agnostic PAC learnability of the Nash approximator. In addition to theoretical analysis, we demonstrate an application of NE approximator in experiments. The trained NE approximator can be used to warm-start and accelerate classical NE solvers. Together, our results show the practicability of approximating NE through function approximation.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 23 of its 69 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Aug 2021.
Builds on
23 of 69 references.
References · 23
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11 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 2; 2024: 1; 2025: 1.
4 papers.
- 2023On the Convergence of No-Regret Learning Dynamics in Time-Varying Gamescited by 14
- 2023Are Equivariant Equilibrium Approximators Beneficial?cited by 2
- 2024Large-Scale Contextual Market Equilibrium Computation through Deep Learningcited by 0
- 2025Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctionscited by 0
- 2025Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions3 Jul 2025
- 2024Large-Scale Contextual Market Equilibrium Computation through Deep Learning11 Jun 2024
- 2023Are Equivariant Equilibrium Approximators Beneficial?27 Jan 2023
- 2023On the Convergence of No-Regret Learning Dynamics in Time-Varying Games26 Jan 2023