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Inapproximability of Nash Equilibrium

arXiv 1405.3322 ↗First posted 13 May 2014cs.GTcited by 14

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Abstract (arXiv)

We prove that finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant ε and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As corollaries, we also prove similar inapproximability results for Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a two-player incomplete information game with a constant number of actions, for relative ε-Well Supported Nash Equilibrium in a two-player game, for market equilibrium in a non-monotone market, for the generalized circuit problem defined by Chen, Deng, and Teng [CDT'09], and for approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes with indivisible goods.

Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 13 May 2014.

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Citing papers per year: 2021: 2; 2022: 1; 2023: 3; 2024: 2; 2025: 3; 2026: 3.

14 papers.

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