Learning and Computation of Phi-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Phi-equilibria -- and the associated notion of Phi-regret -- are a powerful and flexible framework at the heart of online learning and game theory, whereby enriching the set of deviations Phi begets stronger notions of rationality. Recently, Daskalakis, Farina, Fishelson, Pipis, and Schneider (STOC '24) -- abbreviated as DFFPS -- settled the existence of efficient algorithms when Phi contains only linear maps under a general, d-dimensional convex constraint set X. In this paper, we significantly extend their work by resolving the case where Phi is k-dimensional; degree-ℓ polynomials constitute a canonical such example with k = dO(ℓ). In particular, positing only oracle access to X, we obtain two main positive results: i) a poly(n, d, k, log(1/ε))-time algorithm for computing ε-approximate Phi-equilibria in n-player multilinear games, and ii) an efficient online algorithm that incurs average Phi-regret at most ε using poly(d, k)/ε2 rounds. We also show nearly matching lower bounds in the online learning setting, thereby obtaining for the first time a family of deviations that captures the learnability of Phi-regret. From a technical standpoint, we extend the framework of DFFPS from linear maps to the more challenging case of maps with polynomial dimension. At the heart of our approach is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an expected fixed point of any φ : X → X based on the ellipsoid against hope (EAH) algorithm of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM '08). In particular, our algorithm for computing Phi-equilibria is based on executing EAH in a nested fashion -- each step of EAH itself being implemented by invoking a separate call to EAH.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 23 of its 60 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Feb 2025.
Builds on
23 of 60 references.
References · 23
- 2017DeepStack: Expert-Level Artificial Intelligence in No-Limit Pokercited by 233
- 2019Strategizing against No-regret Learnerscited by 50
- 2022Strategizing against Learners in Bayesian Gamescited by 34
- 2023Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibriacited by 32
- 2016Settling the complexity of computing approximate two-player Nash equilibriacited by 31
- 2024Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agentscited by 25
- 2022Regret Minimization and Convergence to Equilibria in General-sum Markov Gamescited by 24
- 2024Contracting with a Learning Agentcited by 23
- 2020Hindsight and Sequential Rationality of Correlated Playcited by 22
- 2021Simple Uncoupled No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibriumcited by 22
- 2022Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamicscited by 22
- 2014Inapproximability of Nash Equilibriumcited by 17
11 more
- 2019Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Gamescited by 17
- 2021Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Gamescited by 15
- 2022Efficient Phi-Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games via Online Mirror Descentcited by 15
- 2024Near-Optimal Policy Optimization for Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Gamescited by 13
- 2024Efficient Learning and Computation of Linear Correlated Equilibrium in General Convex Gamescited by 12
- 2023Polynomial-Time Linear-Swap Regret Minimization in Imperfect-Information Sequential Gamescited by 9
- 2024A Lower Bound on Swap Regret in Extensive-Form Gamescited by 8
- 2024Maximizing utility in multi-agent environments by anticipating the behavior of other learnerscited by 8
- 2024First-order (coarse) correlated equilibria in non-concave gamescited by 5
- 2023Constrained Phi-Equilibriacited by 4
- 2024Polynomial-Time Computation of Exact Phi-Equilibria in Polyhedral Gamescited by 4
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 3.
4 papers.
- 2025Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and Gamescited by 3
- 2026An Efficient Black-Box Reduction from Online Learning to Multicalibration, and a New Route to Phi-Regret Minimizationcited by 3
- 2026Swap Regret Minimization Through Response-Based Approachabilitycited by 2
- 2026Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Gamescited by 0
- 2026Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games2 Oct 2026
- 2026An Efficient Black-Box Reduction from Online Learning to Multicalibration, and a New Route to Phi-Regret Minimization21 Apr 2026
- 2026Swap Regret Minimization Through Response-Based Approachability5 Feb 2026
- 2025Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and Games3 Nov 2025