mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Authorization Before Context: A Model-Neutral Audience Boundary Against Cross-Audience Memory Leakage in Agentic Systems

arXiv 2608.17148 ↗First posted 17 Aug 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent memory systems

Abstract (arXiv)

A personal language agent learns a fact from one audience and may later place it in the prompt it assembles for another. This memory-to-context step is an attack surface: ambiguous or inconsistent channels, cross-audience prying, and poisoned memory can each cause the system to assemble context containing a fact relevant to the query yet unauthorized for the current viewers. We introduce authorization before context: a single, anti-monotone audience-membership rule applied at the memory-to-context transition. Each item carries the audience present when it was recorded; the current viewer set is read from channel metadata and falls back to public when ambiguous; and the item is admitted only when every current viewer already belonged to its audience. We prove that this rule gives every participant cross-channel recall while ensuring, by exclusion rather than by model behavior, that nothing recorded for a narrower audience reaches a broader one and that poisoned memory cannot widen its own audience. The boundary is a model-neutral invariant on the exact assembled context: a forbidden fact must be absent before the model is called. On a synthetic Contextual-Integrity suite, no forbidden fact entered the context our boundary assembled, whereas unscoped baselines included such facts by construction; we further audit that every read path fails closed. The evidence is preliminary and synthetic.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent memory systems, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 18 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Aug 2026.

Builds on

18 of 27 references.

Closest ancestors · 6

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026GroupMemBench: Benchmarking LLM Agent Memory in Multi-Party Conversations14 May
  2. 2026MemoryArena: Benchmarking Agent Memory in Interdependent Multi-Session Agentic Tasks18 Feb
  3. 2026Evaluating Memory Structure in LLM Agents11 Feb
  4. 2025Evaluating Memory in LLM Agents via Incremental Multi-Turn Interactions7 Jul
  5. 2025Collaborative Memory: Multi-User Memory Sharing in LLM Agents with Dynamic Access Control23 May
  6. 2025Mem0: Building Production-Ready AI Agents with Scalable Long-Term Memory28 Apr

Other references · 12

  1. 2023MemoryBank: Enhancing Large Language Models with Long-Term Memorycited by 556
  2. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Basescited by 429
  3. 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memorycited by 101
  4. 2025MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrievalcited by 72
  5. 2026AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocationscited by 38
  6. 2025MAGPIE: A benchmark for Multi-AGent contextual PrIvacy Evaluationcited by 29
  7. 2026Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 27
  8. 2025CIMemories: A Compositional Benchmark for Contextual Integrity of Persistent Memory in LLMscited by 26
  9. 2026MemMorph: Tool Hijacking in LLM Agents via Memory Poisoningcited by 9
  10. 2026Observable Channels, Not Just Storage: Evaluating Privacy Leakage in LLM Agent Pipelinescited by 4
  11. 2026Hijacking Agent Memory: Stealthy Trojan Attacks Through Conversational Interactioncited by 4
  12. 2026Spore: Efficient and Training-Free Privacy Extraction Attack on LLMs via Inference-Time Hybrid Probingcited by 3

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Can Agents Forget When Asked? A Benchmark for Memory Unlearning in LLM Agents
  2. 2026Revoked but Still Authoritative: An Empirical Study of Revocation Enforcement in Agent-Memory Systems
  3. 2026Can You Keep a Secret? Involuntary Information Leakage in Language Model Writing
  4. 2026Beyond Refusal: Probing the Limits of Agentic Self-Correction for Semantic Sensitive Information
  5. 2026LLMs Can't Play Hangman: On the Necessity of a Private Working Memory for Language Agents
  6. 2026AIM: A Privacy-Aware Interoperable Memory Framework for Multi-Agent Multi-User LLM Systems
  7. 2026Less Context, More Accuracy: A Bi-Temporal Memory Engine for LLM Agents Where a Lean Retrieved Context Beats the Full History
  8. 2025Response Attack: Exploiting Contextual Priming to Jailbreak Large Language Models