mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Audience-Bound Persistent Memory: Authorization Across the Memory Lifecycle

arXiv 2609.36373 ↗First posted 28 Sep 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

A personal language agent that acts for its owner across private and shared conversations can learn a fact from one audience and later place it in the context it assembles for another. We study authorization before context across the whole memory lifecycle. Each memory item carries the audience present when it was recorded; derived items are partitioned by audience, receive the intersection of their sources' audiences, or are suppressed; an audience widens only by an explicit, object-specific grant; and an item enters a model attempt only when every current viewer belongs to one of its authorized audiences, with unresolved viewers failing closed to public-only. Under explicit identity, provenance and complete-mediation assumptions, this admission is sound and policy-complete on the exact assembled context, enforced by exclusion rather than by model behavior. We realize it in two independently persisted reference architectures, a flat store and a relationship graph, and, descriptively, in a native agent-memory runtime. In a prospectively frozen confirmation over 10,000 multi-party histories, no forbidden item entered any architecture's context, whereas unscoped retrieval exposed forbidden items in 82% of its contexts. Entitled recall matched policy-equivalent baselines exactly and exceeded unscoped retrieval by 0.30 Recall@5, with a Holm-confirmed advantage that grows with distractors. No architecture produced a wrong-principal substitution, but unscoped substitutions were too rare to establish the prespecified joint decision.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 42 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Sep 2026.

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24 of 42 references.

References · 24

  1. 2024Evaluating Very Long-Term Conversational Memory of LLM Agentscited by 830
  2. 2024LongMemEval: Benchmarking Chat Assistants on Long-Term Interactive Memorycited by 707
  3. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Designcited by 297
  4. 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 121
  5. 2025Collaborative Memory: Multi-User Memory Sharing in LLM Agents with Dynamic Access Controlcited by 61
  6. 2026Formal Policy Enforcement for Real-World Agentic Systemscited by 33
  7. 2026Evaluating Long-Horizon Memory for Multi-Party Collaborative Dialoguescited by 22
  8. 2026Securing LLM-Agent Long-Term Memory Against Poisoning: Non-Malleable, Origin-Bound Authority with Machine-Checked Guaranteescited by 18
  9. 2026GroupMemBench: Benchmarking LLM Agent Memory in Multi-Party Conversationscited by 17
  10. 2026GateMem: Benchmarking Memory Governance in Multi-Principal Shared-Memory Agentscited by 13
  11. 2026MAP-Graph: Provenance-Aware Shared Memory for Multi-Agent Workflowscited by 9
  12. 2026When Memory Becomes Authority: Benchmarking Authority Collapse at the Memory Consolidation Boundarycited by 8
12 more
  1. 2026Multi-User Large Language Model Agentscited by 7
  2. 2026Can LLM-as-a-Judge Reliably Verify Rubrics in Agentic Scenarios?cited by 7
  3. 2026Agent Memory Is a Surface for Endogenous Authorization Launderingcited by 5
  4. 2026Deployment-Time Memorization in Foundation-Model Agentscited by 4
  5. 2026MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repaircited by 4
  6. 2026Memory Provenance Laundering in LLM Agents: A Non-Amplification Firewall for Persistent Memorycited by 4
  7. 2026A Judge Should Know What Changed:Construct Validity for LLM-as-a-Judge Evaluationcited by 4
  8. 2026Judging LLM-as-a-Judge: Concerning Rubric Artifacts in LLM-based Automated Text Generation Evaluationcited by 3
  9. 2026PiSAs: Benchmarking Contextual Integrity in Multi-User Agentic Systemscited by 2
  10. 2026MutMem: Cryptographically Authorized Mutation in Persistent Agent Memorycited by 2
  11. 2026SuperLocalMemory 4.0: The Governed Memory Operating System for AI Agentscited by 2
  12. 2026Authorization Before Context: A Model-Neutral Audience Boundary Against Cross-Audience Memory Leakage in Agentic Systemscited by 1

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