Runtime Governance for Agentic AI: Action-Boundary Control with Trusted Provenance and Fail-Closed Execution
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Agentic AI systems request tool actions that can modify files, send messages, launch jobs, or change workflow state. This shifts the safety problem from harmful text generation to harmful operational side effects. Prompt-level governance can shape model behavior, but it does not create an execution boundary. We introduce Aegis, a runtime governance system that treats model outputs as action proposals and mediates them through a trusted decision layer before tool execution. The model proposes; the trusted runtime decides. Aegis evaluates proposals against active policy state, resolves provenance server-side, fails closed under uncertainty, and routes selected cases through Senate-style settlement, a quorum- based non-unilateral authorization path. We evaluate Aegis on a repeated sandbox corpus spanning five run families, 42 tasks, three conditions, and ten repeats per family. Across 6,300 rows, prompt-policy conditioning produced 79 risky comparator-path leakage rows. Across 2,100 Aegis-governed rows, the system recorded zero governed mock-tool applications and zero governed risky side-effect completions. All 1,832 Aegis-attempted governed rows preserved trusted Aegis-resolved provenance, and all 1,019 Senate-settled rows had quorum and final signed tally evidence. These results do not prove general autonomous-agent safety. They support the narrower systems claim that, in this evaluated sandbox corpus, runtime action-boundary governance prevented observed risky proposals from becoming governed side effects.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 9 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 May 2026.
Builds on
9 of 29 references.
Closest ancestors · 5
Same direction, newest first
- 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety8 Jul
- 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
Other references · 4
- 2021Run Time Assurance for Safety-Critical Systems: An Introduction to Safety Filtering Approaches for Complex Control Systemscited by 27
- 2024Towards Reproducible LLM Evaluation: Quantifying Uncertainty in LLM Benchmark Scorescited by 25
- 2025ReasonBENCH: Benchmarking the (In)Stability of LLM Reasoningcited by 9
- 2026Cryptographic Runtime Governance for Autonomous AI Systems: The Aegis Architecture for Verifiable Policy Enforcementcited by 5
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths
- 2026Beyond Task Success: An Evidence-Synthesis Framework for Evaluating, Governing, and Orchestrating Agentic AI
- 2026Behavioral Governance for Autonomous AI Agents: The AgentBound Framework
- 2025MI9: An Integrated Runtime Governance Framework for Agentic AI
- 2026CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems
- 2026A Policy Algebra for Trust-Preserving Agentic AI Execution
- 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems
- 2026Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract