mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems

arXiv 2607.13716 ↗First posted 15 Jul 2026cs.AIcited by 4

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 5 of its 39 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Jul 2026.

Builds on

5 of 39 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 4

  1. 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,373
  2. 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,267
  3. 2026Proof-Carrying Agent Actions: Model-Agnostic Runtime Governance for Heterogeneous Agent Systemscited by 7
  4. 2026Governance Gaps in Agent Interoperability Protocols: What MCP, A2A, and ACP Cannot Expresscited by 3

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Behavioral Governance for Autonomous AI Agents: The AgentBound Framework
  2. 2026Runtime Governance for Agentic AI: Action-Boundary Control with Trusted Provenance and Fail-Closed Execution
  3. 2026Faramesh: A Protocol-Agnostic Execution Control Plane for Autonomous Agent Systems
  4. 2026Verifiable Agentic Infrastructure: Proof-Derived Authorization for Sovereign AI Systems
  5. 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems
  6. 2026Beyond Task Success: An Evidence-Synthesis Framework for Evaluating, Governing, and Orchestrating Agentic AI
  7. 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths
  8. 2026From Intent to Execution Grant: An Execution-Boundary Conformance Profile for High-Risk AI Actions