mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Stateful Governance for Concurrent Agentic Systems

arXiv 2608.02764 ↗First posted 3 Aug 2026cs.MA cs.DBcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

AI agents are moving from advisory interfaces into systems that execute consequential operations: issuing refunds, reserving scarce inventory, provisioning cloud resources, and initiating financial transfers. These workflows require governance over effects, not only over model outputs. Existing safeguards often decide whether an action is allowed from the information available when the action is requested. For stateful policies, that request-time view may be incomplete: budgets, inventory, approval status, and risk signals can change before the effect occurs, making an earlier authorization or approval stale. This paper studies stateful governance for concurrent agentic systems. We identify stale authorization as the core failure mode and define policy-state serializability, a correctness condition requiring committed effects to be explainable as authorized against the policy state immediately before they occur. We present MasuGate, a runtime architecture that keeps policies as reviewable programs while coordinating the state and effects needed to preserve their decisions. In experiments with a PostgreSQL-backed prototype of MasuGate, the system prevents stale authorizations missed by baselines that pass policy state as ordinary request context, preserves delayed approvals while unrelated work proceeds, keeps policy evolution mostly in policy text rather than trusted provider code, and avoids policy violations in a scripted, LLM-free procurement workflow where agent-governance baselines produce stale authorizations over shared budgets and inventory. More broadly, MasuGate suggests a path for integrating stateful governance boundaries into agent frameworks and provider-backed domains where agents act on shared resources.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Aug 2026.

Builds on

8 of 32 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Temporary Authority, Permanent Effects: Commit-Time Authorization for LLM Agents11 Jul
  2. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 6

  1. 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,280
  2. 2024Cedar: A New Language for Expressive, Fast, Safe, and Analyzable Authorization (Extended Version)cited by 31
  3. 2026Atomix: Timely, Transactional Tool Use for Reliable Agentic Workflowscited by 27
  4. 2026S-Bus: Automatic Read-Set Reconstruction for Multi-Agent LLM State Coordinationcited by 8
  5. 2026CoAgent: Concurrency Control for Multi-Agent Systemscited by 4
  6. 2013Blazes: Coordination Analysis for Distributed Programscited by 1

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  1. 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths
  2. 2026Behavioral Governance for Autonomous AI Agents: The AgentBound Framework
  3. 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems
  4. 2026Runtime Governance for Agentic AI: Action-Boundary Control with Trusted Provenance and Fail-Closed Execution
  5. 2026Deontic Policies for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems
  6. 2026A Policy Algebra for Trust-Preserving Agentic AI Execution
  7. 2026Governance at the Boundary: How Agent Decomposition Degrades Policy Compliance
  8. 2025Governance-as-a-Service: A Multi-Agent Framework for AI System Compliance and Policy Enforcement