mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Proteus: A Self-Evolving Red Team for Agent Skill Ecosystems

arXiv 2605.11891 ↗First posted 12 May 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

also in 2 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Agent skills extend LLM agents with reusable instructions, tool interfaces, and executable code, and users increasingly install third-party skills from marketplaces, repositories, and community channels. Because a skill exposes both executable behavior and context-setting documentation, its deployment risk cannot be measured by single-shot audits or prompt-level red teams alone: a realistic attacker can use audit and runtime feedback to repeatedly rewrite the skill. We frame this risk as adaptive leakage -- whether a budgeted attacker can iteratively revise a skill until it passes audit and produces verified runtime harm -- and present ours, a grey-box self-evolving red-team framework for measuring it. Proteus searches a formalized five-axis skill-attack space. Each candidate is evaluated through a unified audit-sandbox-oracle pipeline that returns structured audit findings and runtime evidence to guide cross-round mutation. Beyond initial evasion, Proteus performs path expansion, which finds alternative implementations of successful attacks, and surface expansion, which transfers learned implementation patterns to new attack objectives beyond the original seed catalogue. Across eight phase-1 cells, Proteus reaches 40--90% Attack Success Rate at 5 rounds (ASR@5) with positive learning-curve slopes on both evaluated auditors. Phase-2 path/surface expansion produces 438 jointly bypassing and lethal variants, with SkillVetter bypassed at ≥ 93% in every cell and AI-Infra-Guard, the strongest public auditor we evaluate, still admitting up to 41.3% joint-success. These results show that current skill vetting substantially underestimates residual risk when evaluated against adaptive, feedback-driven attackers.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 39 of its 42 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 May 2026.

Builds on

39 of 42 references.

Closest ancestors · 11

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026SkillProbe: Security Auditing for Emerging Agent Skill Marketplaces via Multi-Agent Collaboration22 Mar
  2. 2026Trojan's Whisper: Stealthy Manipulation of OpenClaw through Injected Bootstrapped Guidance20 Mar
  3. 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild6 Feb
  4. 2026AgenticRed: Evolving Agentic Systems for Red-Teaming20 Jan
  5. 2025Genesis: Evolving Attack Strategies for LLM Web Agent Red-Teaming21 Oct
  6. 2025RedCodeAgent: Automatic Red-teaming Agent against Diverse Code Agents2 Oct
  7. 2025Red-Teaming LLM Multi-Agent Systems via Communication Attacks20 Feb
  8. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  9. 2024EIA: Environmental Injection Attack on Generalist Web Agents for Privacy Leakage17 Sep
  10. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  11. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar

Other references · 28

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  2. 2023Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learningcited by 4,276
  3. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  4. 2023Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behaviorcited by 3,568
  5. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  6. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
  7. 2023Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Modelscited by 2,191
  8. 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
  9. 2023MetaGPT: Meta Programming for A Multi-Agent Collaborative Frameworkcited by 1,808
  10. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
  11. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  12. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,420
16 more
  1. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  2. 2023GAIA: a benchmark for General AI Assistantscited by 1,128
  3. 2023AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Modelscited by 785
  4. 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learnedcited by 729
  5. 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 672
  6. 2023"Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Modelscited by 489
  7. 2021Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributionscited by 431
  8. 2024Rainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Promptscited by 205
  9. 2024EvoAgent: Towards Automatic Multi-Agent Generation via Evolutionary Algorithmscited by 113
  10. 2024Curiosity-driven Red-teaming for Large Language Modelscited by 88
  11. 2024Neural Exec: Learning (and Learning from) Execution Triggers for Prompt Injection Attackscited by 85
  12. 2023LLM Platform Security: Applying a Systematic Evaluation Framework to OpenAI's ChatGPT Pluginscited by 51
  13. 2025AutoRedTeamer: Autonomous Red Teaming with Lifelong Attack Integrationcited by 43
  14. 2026Context Matters: Repository-Aware Security Analysis of the Agent Skill Ecosystemcited by 11
  15. 2025Active Attacks: Red-teaming LLMs via Adaptive Environmentscited by 7
  16. 2026Structured Security Auditing and Robustness Enhancement for Untrusted Agent Skillscited by 7

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026SkillDRE: Dual-Stage Red-Team Evolution of Agent Skills via Pre-Execution and Runtime Feedback
  2. 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement
  3. 2026Practice Makes Unsafe: Skill Misevolution in Self-Improving LLM Agents
  4. 2026Can Agents Trust Their Skills? Uncovering Unsafe Chains of Trust in Skill-Based LLM Agents
  5. 2026When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systems
  6. 2026SkillAtlas: An Attack Trace Library for Agent Skills
  7. 2026RedEvoAgent: Automatic Red-Teaming Agent with Experience-Driven Skill Evolution
  8. 2026EvoSkill Injection: Red-Teaming Autonomous Skill Generation and Evolution in Self-Evolving Agents