AgentDyn: Are Your Agent Security Defenses Deployable in Real-World Dynamic Environments?
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Cited by 37 in LLM agents and tool use, but placed by its own abstract, which didn’t fit.
Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments have shown great promise across real-world applications. However, their reliance on external data exposes them to serious indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behaviors. To mitigate this threat, a growing number of defenses have been proposed and evaluated under existing agent security benchmarks. These benchmarks provide structured environments for comparing attacks and defenses, and have become a key driver for defense design and optimization. However, as agents move toward more complex and open-ended real-world deployments, there is a pressing need for benchmarks to become more adaptive and better reflect the dynamic environments faced by real-world agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in the current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.
Key facts. Cited by 45 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 3 Feb 2026.
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 45.
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- 2026ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agentscited by 15
- 2026PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluationcited by 10
- 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attackscited by 9
- 2026HINTBench: Horizon-agent Intrinsic Non-attack Trajectory Benchmarkcited by 8
- 2026AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Securitycited by 7
- 2026No Attacker Needed: Unintentional Cross-User Contamination in Shared-State LLM Agentscited by 6
- 2026SafeEvolve: Harness-Policy Co-Evolution from Agent Experience for Safety Alignmentcited by 6
- 2026SABER: Benchmarking Operational Safety of LLM Coding Agents in Stateful Project Workspacescited by 5
- 2026Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environmentscited by 5
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 5
- 2026Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMscited by 4
- 2026AutoDojo: Adaptive Black-Box Attacks Reveal the Limits of IPI Defenses and Task-Specification Effects in LLM Agentscited by 4
33 more
- 2026An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Datacited by 3
- 2026Intent-Governed Tool Authorization for AI Agentscited by 3
- 2026NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operationscited by 3
- 2026Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden Statescited by 3
- 2026Hallucination as Exploit: Evidence-Carrying Multimodal Agentscited by 2
- 2026Who Pays the Price? Stakeholder-Centric Prompt Injection Benchmarking for Real-world Web Agentscited by 2
- 2026Adaptive Evaluation of Out-of-Band Defenses Against Prompt Injection in LLM Agentscited by 2
- 2026Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teamingcited by 2
- 2026SingGuard-NSFA: Extensible Guardrails for Agentic AI via Generative Reasoning and Real-Time Classificationcited by 2
- 2026Permission Denied: Policy-Graded Evaluation of Coding Agents in Hardened Environmentscited by 2
- 2026EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agentscited by 2
- 2026AgentDrift: A Step-Labeled Benchmark of Injection-Hijacked LLM Agent Trajectoriescited by 2
- 2026Security of OpenClaw Agents: Fundamentals, Attacks, and Countermeasurescited by 1
- 2026LongPIBench: A Long-Context Benchmark for Prompt Injectioncited by 1
- 2026CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinementcited by 1
- 2026ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validationcited by 1
- 2026ContainmentBench: Trace-Based Evaluation of Post-Exposure Containment in Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026AgentAntibody: An Adaptive Immune System for Defending LLM Agents against Prompt Injectioncited by 0
- 2026Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Textcited by 0
- 2026Hardware Keystores for AI Agent Signing Workflows: A Zero-Trust MCP Enforcement Architecturecited by 0
- 2026PIPES: Securing Agent Perception with Provenance and Priorscited by 0
- 2026AgentDecarbonizer: Carbon-Aware Execution for AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026When Tool Outputs Become Commands: Separating Action Induction from Runtime Authorization in Tool-Augmented LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026DriftNet: A Dual-Head Trajectory Transformer for Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection in LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systemscited by 0
- 2026Evaluating System One Models for Agent Security Decisions: Reliability, Calibration, and Selective Automationcited by 0
- 2026Climbing the Hill: Prompt Injection Red-Teaming Against Frontier Models with Curriculum Reinforcement Learningcited by 0
- 2026SINGED: Correct Outputs Do Not Certify Safe Execution in LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steeringcited by 0
- 2026SafeCoEvo: Co-Evolving Safety Harnesses and Guards for LLM Agents at Test-Timecited by 0
- 2026HARDE: Optimizing Agent Harnesses for Runtime Risk Detection and Execution Controlcited by 0
- 2026PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026When AI Finds Hidden Messages, Does It Report?cited by 0
- 2026When AI Finds Hidden Messages, Does It Report?7 Oct 2026
- 2026PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents1 Oct 2026
- 2026HARDE: Optimizing Agent Harnesses for Runtime Risk Detection and Execution Control29 Sep 2026
- 2026SafeCoEvo: Co-Evolving Safety Harnesses and Guards for LLM Agents at Test-Time29 Sep 2026
- 2026CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steering29 Sep 2026
- 2026SINGED: Correct Outputs Do Not Certify Safe Execution in LLM Agents27 Sep 2026
- 2026Climbing the Hill: Prompt Injection Red-Teaming Against Frontier Models with Curriculum Reinforcement Learning27 Sep 2026
- 2026Evaluating System One Models for Agent Security Decisions: Reliability, Calibration, and Selective Automation27 Sep 2026
- 2026ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validation21 Sep 2026
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems20 Sep 2026
- 2026DriftNet: A Dual-Head Trajectory Transformer for Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection in LLM Agents9 Sep 2026
- 2026CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinement7 Sep 2026
33 more
- 2026AgentDrift: A Step-Labeled Benchmark of Injection-Hijacked LLM Agent Trajectories7 Sep 2026
- 2026EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agents5 Sep 2026
- 2026SafeEvolve: Harness-Policy Co-Evolution from Agent Experience for Safety Alignment2 Sep 2026
- 2026LongPIBench: A Long-Context Benchmark for Prompt Injection28 Aug 2026
- 2026When Tool Outputs Become Commands: Separating Action Induction from Runtime Authorization in Tool-Augmented LLM Agents27 Aug 2026
- 2026AgentDecarbonizer: Carbon-Aware Execution for AI Agents20 Aug 2026
- 2026PIPES: Securing Agent Perception with Provenance and Priors13 Aug 2026
- 2026Hardware Keystores for AI Agent Signing Workflows: A Zero-Trust MCP Enforcement Architecture6 Aug 2026
- 2026Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Text5 Aug 2026
- 2026AgentAntibody: An Adaptive Immune System for Defending LLM Agents against Prompt Injection4 Aug 2026
- 2026Permission Denied: Policy-Graded Evaluation of Coding Agents in Hardened Environments2 Aug 2026
- 2026Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States1 Aug 2026
- 2026ContainmentBench: Trace-Based Evaluation of Post-Exposure Containment in Tool-Using LLM Agents27 Jul 2026
- 2026SingGuard-NSFA: Extensible Guardrails for Agentic AI via Generative Reasoning and Real-Time Classification13 Jul 2026
- 2026Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teaming13 Jul 2026
- 2026NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations11 Jul 2026
- 2026Adaptive Evaluation of Out-of-Band Defenses Against Prompt Injection in LLM Agents25 Jun 2026
- 2026Intent-Governed Tool Authorization for AI Agents22 Jun 2026
- 2026AutoDojo: Adaptive Black-Box Attacks Reveal the Limits of IPI Defenses and Task-Specification Effects in LLM Agents13 Jun 2026
- 2026Who Pays the Price? Stakeholder-Centric Prompt Injection Benchmarking for Real-world Web Agents11 Jun 2026
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation9 Jun 2026
- 2026Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environments9 Jun 2026
- 2026SABER: Benchmarking Operational Safety of LLM Coding Agents in Stateful Project Workspaces31 May 2026
- 2026AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security28 May 2026
- 2026Security of OpenClaw Agents: Fundamentals, Attacks, and Countermeasures25 May 2026
- 2026Hallucination as Exploit: Evidence-Carrying Multimodal Agents18 May 2026
- 2026An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data21 Apr 2026
- 2026HINTBench: Horizon-agent Intrinsic Non-attack Trajectory Benchmark15 Apr 2026
- 2026PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluation9 Apr 2026
- 2026Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMs4 Apr 2026
- 2026ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agents1 Apr 2026
- 2026No Attacker Needed: Unintentional Cross-User Contamination in Shared-State LLM Agents1 Apr 2026
- 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks31 Mar 2026
- 2026ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agentscited by 15
- 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attackscited by 9
- 2026HINTBench: Horizon-agent Intrinsic Non-attack Trajectory Benchmarkcited by 8
- 2026AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Securitycited by 7
- 2026No Attacker Needed: Unintentional Cross-User Contamination in Shared-State LLM Agentscited by 6
- 2026SafeEvolve: Harness-Policy Co-Evolution from Agent Experience for Safety Alignmentcited by 6
- 2026SABER: Benchmarking Operational Safety of LLM Coding Agents in Stateful Project Workspacescited by 5
- 2026Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environmentscited by 5
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 5
- 2026Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMscited by 4
- 2026AutoDojo: Adaptive Black-Box Attacks Reveal the Limits of IPI Defenses and Task-Specification Effects in LLM Agentscited by 4
- 2026NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operationscited by 3
12 most cited of 37 All 37 (JSON)
- 2026PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents1 Oct 2026
- 2026HARDE: Optimizing Agent Harnesses for Runtime Risk Detection and Execution Control29 Sep 2026
- 2026SafeCoEvo: Co-Evolving Safety Harnesses and Guards for LLM Agents at Test-Time29 Sep 2026
- 2026CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steering29 Sep 2026
- 2026SINGED: Correct Outputs Do Not Certify Safe Execution in LLM Agents27 Sep 2026
- 2026Evaluating System One Models for Agent Security Decisions: Reliability, Calibration, and Selective Automation27 Sep 2026
- 2026ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validation21 Sep 2026
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems20 Sep 2026
- 2026DriftNet: A Dual-Head Trajectory Transformer for Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection in LLM Agents9 Sep 2026
- 2026CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinement7 Sep 2026
- 2026AgentDrift: A Step-Labeled Benchmark of Injection-Hijacked LLM Agent Trajectories7 Sep 2026
- 2026EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agents5 Sep 2026
12 newest of 37 All 37 (JSON)
- 2026PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluationcited by 10
- 2026LongPIBench: A Long-Context Benchmark for Prompt Injectioncited by 1
- 2026Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Textcited by 0
- 2026Climbing the Hill: Prompt Injection Red-Teaming Against Frontier Models with Curriculum Reinforcement Learningcited by 0
- 2026Climbing the Hill: Prompt Injection Red-Teaming Against Frontier Models with Curriculum Reinforcement Learning27 Sep 2026
- 2026LongPIBench: A Long-Context Benchmark for Prompt Injection28 Aug 2026
- 2026Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Text5 Aug 2026
- 2026PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluation9 Apr 2026
- 2026An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Datacited by 3
- 2026Intent-Governed Tool Authorization for AI Agentscited by 3
- 2026PIPES: Securing Agent Perception with Provenance and Priorscited by 0
- 2026When AI Finds Hidden Messages, Does It Report?cited by 0
- 2026When AI Finds Hidden Messages, Does It Report?7 Oct 2026
- 2026PIPES: Securing Agent Perception with Provenance and Priors13 Aug 2026
- 2026Intent-Governed Tool Authorization for AI Agents22 Jun 2026
- 2026An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data21 Apr 2026
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