mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Model Forensics: Investigating Whether Concerning Behavior Reflects Misalignment

arXiv 2606.26071 ↗First posted 24 Jun 2026cs.LG cs.AIcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

A central goal of safety research is determining whether a model is misaligned. Prior work has largely focused on detecting concerning behavior. But behavior alone does not establish misalignment: a concerning action can arise from benign causes such as confusion. This motivates model forensics: investigating whether the action was driven by malign intent. In this paper, we propose a baseline protocol for model forensics consisting of two steps, iterated as needed. First, we read the chain of thought (CoT) to generate hypotheses about what drives model behavior. Second, we make edits to the prompt or environment to test these hypotheses. While the CoT is not always faithful, it is a rich source of unsupervised insight that can guide the collection of more rigorous evidence. To evaluate our protocol, we create a suite of six agentic environments where models exhibit concerning behavior, and apply it to each. We establish that Kimi K2 Thinking takes shortcuts due to a genuine disposition towards low-effort actions, by showing this hypothesis successfully predicts its behavior. Through counterfactual experiments, we show DeepSeek R1 deceives out of a desire to be consistent with a previous instance of itself. Our methods nonetheless leave significant room for refinement. For example, when we test whether Kimi K2 Thinking believes it is violating user intent, we find no evidence of such a belief, but without positive controls we cannot confirm our tests would detect it. Overall, we find our simple protocol provides a strong baseline that we hope future work will improve upon. More broadly, our work is a concrete step in developing the growing field of model forensics.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 34 of its 64 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Jun 2026.

Builds on

34 of 64 references.

References · 34

  1. 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 922
  2. 2024Training Large Language Models to Reason in a Continuous Latent Spacecited by 797
  3. 2023Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoningcited by 703
  4. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
  5. 2025Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Thinkcited by 415
  6. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
  7. 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
  8. 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 287
  9. 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetycited by 249
  10. 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 229
  11. 2023Model evaluation for extreme riskscited by 177
  12. 2025Chain-of-Thought Reasoning In The Wild Is Not Always Faithfulcited by 170
22 more
  1. 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threatscited by 158
  2. 2025Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RLcited by 136
  3. 2025Thought Anchors: Which LLM Reasoning Steps Matter?cited by 129
  4. 2024Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilitiescited by 128
  5. 2023Evaluating Language-Model Agents on Realistic Autonomous Taskscited by 96
  6. 2025Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Trainingcited by 86
  7. 2025Auditing language models for hidden objectivescited by 83
  8. 2025ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Casescited by 65
  9. 2025Demonstrating specification gaming in reasoning modelscited by 56
  10. 2025Activation Oracles: Training and Evaluating LLMs as General-Purpose Activation Explainerscited by 52
  11. 2025An Approach to Technical AGI Safety and Securitycited by 45
  12. 2025Ctrl-Z: Controlling AI Agents via Resamplingcited by 44
  13. 2025Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMscited by 22
  14. 2025Training LLMs for Honesty via Confessionscited by 22
  15. 2025Why Do Some Language Models Fake Alignment While Others Don't?cited by 20
  16. 2025Lessons from a Chimp: AI "Scheming" and the Quest for Ape Languagecited by 20
  17. 2025Thought Branches: Interpreting LLM Reasoning Requires Resamplingcited by 16
  18. 2026Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agentscited by 14
  19. 2026A Positive Case for Faithfulness: LLM Self-Explanations Help Predict Model Behaviorcited by 13
  20. 2026Propensity Inference: Environmental Contributors to LLM Behaviourcited by 7
  21. 2026UK AISI Alignment Evaluation Case-Studycited by 6
  22. 2026Gram: Assessing sabotage propensities via automated alignment auditingcited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

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  1. 2025Thought Crime: Backdoors and Emergent Misalignment in Reasoning Models
  2. 2026INTENT-AS-A-TOOL Makes it Easy to Track Agentic Misalignment
  3. 2026Probing the Misaligned Thinking Process of Language Models
  4. 2026AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviors
  5. 2026Selective Disclosure of Hidden Directives in Reasoning Models: Behavioral Asymmetry and Steering
  6. 2026Internal-State Probes Read the Situation, Not the Action: Three Negative Results for Pre-Action Misalignment Monitoring
  7. 2026The Refusal Residue: When Probes Catch Alignment Faking and When They Don't
  8. 2026Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation