Still Camouflage, Moving Illusion: View-Induced Trajectory Manipulation in Autonomous Driving
On the map: End-to-end autonomous driving → Adversarial scenarios and safety testing
Abstract (arXiv)
Existing physical adversarial attacks on vision-based autonomous driving induce time-evolving perception errors, including biased object tracking or trajectory prediction, through (i) sophisticated physical patch inducing detection box drift when entering the view distance, or (ii) dynamically changing patches that cause different perception errors at different time. In both cases, viewing-angle variation is treated as a challenge, requiring adversarial patches to remain effective across frames under varying views, leading to complex multi-view optimization. In contrast, we show that viewing-angle variation itself can be turned into an attack tool. We design a new attack paradigm where a static, passive adversarial camouflage is mounted on a vehicle whose view-dependent appearance naturally evolves with relative motion, inducing consistent feature drift across frames. This causes the system to infer a physically plausible but incorrect trajectory, such as a false cut-in, which propagates to downstream decision-making and triggers unnecessary braking. Unlike prior approaches that require multi-view robustness or active intervention, our attack emerges from normal driving dynamics and is easy to deploy: a parked vehicle with a natural camouflage can induce hard braking in passing autonomous vehicles. We demonstrate the novel attack on nuScenes dataset, showing the effectiveness with an end-to-end success rate of up to 87.5%, measured by hard-braking events, and robustness across different scene backgrounds, victim vehicle speeds, and perception models.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Adversarial scenarios and safety testing, one of 9 directions in End-to-end autonomous driving. Builds on 33 of its 57 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 May 2026.
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33 of 57 references.
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Other references · 32
- 2019nuScenes: A multimodal dataset for autonomous drivingcited by 4,523
- 2024SAM 2: Segment Anything in Images and Videoscited by 2,863
- 2022Planning-oriented Autonomous Drivingcited by 1,087
- 2022BEVFusion: Multi-Task Multi-Sensor Fusion with Unified Bird's-Eye View Representationcited by 850
- 2020Accelerating 3D Deep Learning with PyTorch3Dcited by 784
- 2021BEVDet: High-performance Multi-camera 3D Object Detection in Bird-Eye-Viewcited by 713
- 2023VAD: Vectorized Scene Representation for Efficient Autonomous Drivingcited by 622
- 2022BEVDepth: Acquisition of Reliable Depth for Multi-view 3D Object Detectioncited by 572
- 2020Tracking Objects as Pointscited by 483
- 2022TransFusion: Robust LiDAR-Camera Fusion for 3D Object Detection with Transformerscited by 466
- 2019A Survey of Deep Learning Techniques for Autonomous Drivingcited by 403
- 2022ST-P3: End-to-end Vision-based Autonomous Driving via Spatial-Temporal Feature Learningcited by 368
20 more
- 2022DeepFusion: Lidar-Camera Deep Fusion for Multi-Modal 3D Object Detectioncited by 224
- 2022FUTR3D: A Unified Sensor Fusion Framework for 3D Detectioncited by 194
- 20223D Object Detection for Autonomous Driving: A Comprehensive Surveycited by 132
- 2021Dual Attention Suppression Attack: Generate Adversarial Camouflage in Physical Worldcited by 127
- 2019Universal Physical Camouflage Attacks on Object Detectorscited by 91
- 2022On Adversarial Robustness of Trajectory Prediction for Autonomous Vehiclescited by 90
- 2021Explanations in Autonomous Driving: A Surveycited by 81
- 2021FCA: Learning a 3D Full-coverage Vehicle Camouflage for Multi-view Physical Adversarial Attackcited by 74
- 2021Segment and Complete: Defending Object Detectors against Adversarial Patch Attacks with Robust Patch Detectioncited by 67
- 2022DTA: Physical Camouflage Attacks using Differentiable Transformation Networkcited by 51
- 2023Does Physical Adversarial Example Really Matter to Autonomous Driving? Towards System-Level Effect of Adversarial Object Evasion Attackcited by 37
- 2024PAD: Patch-Agnostic Defense against Adversarial Patch Attackscited by 32
- 2023ACTIVE: Towards Highly Transferable 3D Physical Camouflage for Universal and Robust Vehicle Evasioncited by 31
- 2023TPatch: A Triggered Physical Adversarial Patchcited by 22
- 2021Interactive multi-modal motion planning with Branch Model Predictive Controlcited by 21
- 2023Fusion is Not Enough: Single Modal Attacks on Fusion Models for 3D Object Detectioncited by 11
- 2023Dynamic Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Driving Systemscited by 11
- 20253D Gaussian Splatting Driven Multi-View Robust Physical Adversarial Camouflage Generationcited by 7
- 2024A First Physical-World Trajectory Prediction Attack via LiDAR-induced Deceptions in Autonomous Drivingcited by 3
- 2025Fast-BEV++: Fast by Algorithm, Deployable by Designcited by 2
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- 2025Guided Diffusion-based Generation of Adversarial Objects for Real-World Monocular Depth Estimation Attacks
- 2026The Constant Eye: Benchmarking and Bridging Appearance Robustness in Autonomous Driving
- 2025Universal Camouflage Attack on Vision-Language Models for Autonomous Driving
- 2024Hacking Predictors Means Hacking Cars: Using Sensitivity Analysis to Identify Trajectory Prediction Vulnerabilities for Autonomous Driving Security
- 2026Understanding Adversarial Transferability in Vision-Language Models for Autonomous Driving: A Cross-Architecture Analysis
- 2026Comparative Analysis of Patch Attack on VLM-Based Autonomous Driving Architectures
- 2026RESBev: Making BEV Perception More Robust