Understanding Adversarial Transferability in Vision-Language Models for Autonomous Driving: A Cross-Architecture Analysis
On the map: Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models → MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness
Abstract (arXiv)
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used in autonomous driving because they combine visual perception with language-based reasoning, supporting more interpretable decision-making, yet their robustness to physical adversarial attacks, especially whether such attacks transfer across different VLM architectures, is not well understood and poses a practical risk when attackers do not know which model a vehicle uses. We address this gap with a systematic cross-architecture study of adversarial transferability in VLM-based driving, evaluating three representative architectures (Dolphins, OmniDrive, and LeapVAD) using physically realizable patches placed on roadside infrastructure in both crosswalk and highway scenarios. Our transfer-matrix evaluation shows high cross-architecture effectiveness, with transfer rates of 73-91% (mean TR = 0.815 for crosswalk and 0.833 for highway) and sustained frame-level manipulation over 64.7-79.4% of the critical decision window even when patches are not optimized for the target model.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models. Builds on 6 of its 28 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Apr 2026.
Builds on
6 of 28 references.
References · 6
- 2021Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervisioncited by 33,456
- 2023Visual Instruction Tuningcited by 7,792
- 2016Universal adversarial perturbationscited by 774
- 2017Adversarial Patchcited by 514
- 2017Universal Adversarial Perturbations Against Semantic Image Segmentationcited by 92
- 2025LeapVAD: A Leap in Autonomous Driving via Cognitive Perception and Dual-Process Thinkingcited by 13
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Comparative Analysis of Patch Attack on VLM-Based Autonomous Driving Architectures
- 2024Visual Adversarial Attack on Vision-Language Models for Autonomous Driving
- 2025Black-Box Adversarial Attack on Vision Language Models for Autonomous Driving
- 2025Toward Inherently Robust VLMs Against Visual Perception Attacks
- 2026NutVLM: A Self-Adaptive Defense Framework against Full-Dimension Attacks for Vision Language Models in Autonomous Driving
- 2025CoC-VLA: Delving into Adversarial Domain Transfer for Explainable Autonomous Driving via Chain-of-Causality Visual-Language-Action Model
- 2026Adversarial Flow Matching for Imperceptible Attacks on End-to-End Autonomous Driving
- 2024Towards Transferable Attacks Against Vision-LLMs in Autonomous Driving with Typography