Removing Sandbagging in LLMs by Training with Weak Supervision
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Abstract (arXiv)
As AI systems begin to automate complex tasks, supervision increasingly relies on weaker models or limited human oversight that cannot fully verify output quality. A model more capable than its supervisors could exploit this gap through sandbagging, producing work that appears acceptable but falls short of its true abilities. Can training elicit a model's best work even without reliable verification? We study this using model organisms trained to sandbag, testing elicitation techniques on problem-solving math, graduate-level science, and competitive coding tasks. We find that training with weak supervision can reliably elicit sandbagging models when supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) are combined: SFT on weak demonstrations breaks the sandbagging behavior, enabling RL to then fully elicit performance. Neither method succeeds reliably alone-RL without SFT almost always leads to reward hacking rather than genuine improvement, and SFT without RL fails to elicit full performance when the supervisor is much weaker than the untrusted model. Critically, this relies on training being indistinguishable from deployment; when models can distinguish between training and deployment, they can perform well during training while continuing to sandbag afterward. Our results provide initial evidence that training is a viable mitigation against sandbagging, while highlighting the importance of making training indistinguishable from deployment.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 27 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Apr 2026.
Builds on
27 of 41 references.
References · 27
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15 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
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- 2026Shallow Beliefs: Synthetic document finetuning does not inoculate against emergent misalignment from reward hacking14 Sep 2026
- 2026Diffuse AI Control on Fuzzy Tasks8 Jun 2026
- 2026On Distinguishing Capability Elicitation from Capability Creation in Post-Training: A Free-Energy Perspective8 May 2026
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