SafeClaw-R: Towards Safe and Secure Multi-Agent Personal Assistants
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM-based multi-agent systems (MASs) are transforming personal productivity by autonomously executing complex, cross-platform tasks. Frameworks such as OpenClaw demonstrate the potential of locally deployed agents integrated with personal data and services, but this autonomy introduces significant safety and security risks. Unintended actions from LLM reasoning failures can cause irreversible harm, while prompt injection attacks may exfiltrate credentials or compromise the system. Our analysis shows that 36.4% of OpenClaw's built-in skills pose high or critical risks. Existing approaches, including static guardrails and LLM-as-a-Judge, lack reliable real-time enforcement and consistent authority in MAS settings. To address this, we propose SafeClaw-R, a framework that enforces safety as a system-level invariant over the execution graph by ensuring that actions are mediated prior to execution, and systematically augments skills with safe counterparts. We evaluate SafeClaw-R across three representative domains: productivity platforms, third-party skill ecosystems, and code execution environments. SafeClaw-R achieves 95.2% accuracy in Google Workspace scenarios, significantly outperforming regex baselines (61.6%), detects 97.8% of malicious third-party skill patterns, and achieves 100% detection accuracy in our adversarial code execution benchmark. These results demonstrate that SafeClaw-R enables practical runtime enforcement for autonomous MASs.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 26 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Mar 2026.
Builds on
26 of 40 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs24 Feb
- 2026"Do Not Mention This to the User": Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild6 Feb
- 2026AgentDoG: A Diagnostic Guardrail Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security26 Jan
- 2025ShieldAgent: Shielding Agents via Verifiable Safety Policy Reasoning26 Mar
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2025Multi-Agent Systems Execute Arbitrary Malicious Code15 Mar
- 2024SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents17 Dec
- 2024GuardAgent: Safeguard LLM Agents by a Guard Agent via Knowledge-Enabled Reasoning13 Jun
Other references · 18
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2023Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behaviorcited by 3,568
- 2023A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agentscited by 2,242
- 2023Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Modelscited by 2,191
- 2023MetaGPT: Meta Programming for A Multi-Agent Collaborative Frameworkcited by 1,808
- 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,642
- 2024A Survey on LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 1,423
- 2023CAMEL: Communicative Agents for "Mind" Exploration of Large Language Model Societycited by 1,395
- 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,267
- 2023Siren's Song in the AI Ocean: A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Modelscited by 698
- 2024A Survey on the Memory Mechanism of Large Language Model based Agentscited by 634
6 more
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
- 2024Executable Code Actions Elicit Better LLM Agentscited by 564
- 2025The Ideation-Execution Gap: Execution Outcomes of LLM-Generated versus Human Research Ideascited by 62
- 2025SoK: Evaluating Jailbreak Guardrails for Large Language Modelscited by 21
- 2026Large Language Model Reasoning Failurescited by 21
- 2025LLM-Empowered Embodied Agent for Memory-Augmented Task Planning in Household Roboticscited by 17
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 6.
6 papers.
- 2026From Chatbot to Digital Colleague: The Paradigm Shift Toward Persistent Autonomous AIcited by 6
- 2026TimeClaw: A Time-Series AI Agent with Exploratory Execution Learningcited by 2
- 2026Constraining Host-Level Abuse in Self-Hosted Computer-Use Agents via TEE-Backed Isolationcited by 1
- 2026S3: Improving Agent Safety through Multi-Stage Defensecited by 1
- 2026Direct Causation in International Humanitarian Law and the Challenge of AI-Mediated Civilian Cyber Operationscited by 0
- 2026Safe Actions Alone Do Not Ensure Safe Agents: Identifying Unfulfilled Obligations with Guard Modelscited by 0
- 2026Safe Actions Alone Do Not Ensure Safe Agents: Identifying Unfulfilled Obligations with Guard Models8 Oct 2026
- 2026S3: Improving Agent Safety through Multi-Stage Defense3 Aug 2026
- 2026Direct Causation in International Humanitarian Law and the Challenge of AI-Mediated Civilian Cyber Operations28 Jun 2026
- 2026From Chatbot to Digital Colleague: The Paradigm Shift Toward Persistent Autonomous AI12 Jun 2026
- 2026TimeClaw: A Time-Series AI Agent with Exploratory Execution Learning11 May 2026
- 2026Constraining Host-Level Abuse in Self-Hosted Computer-Use Agents via TEE-Backed Isolation7 May 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw
- 2026From Assistant to Double Agent: Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks on OpenClaw for Personalized Local AI Agent
- 2026OpenSkillRisk: Benchmarking Agent Safety When Using Real-World Risky Third-Party Skills
- 2026Security of OpenClaw Agents: Fundamentals, Attacks, and Countermeasures
- 2026Toward Safe LLM Agents: A Survey of Specification, Verification, and Enforcement
- 2026Taming OpenClaw: Security Analysis and Mitigation of Autonomous LLM Agent Threats
- 2026ClawSafety: "Safe" LLMs, Unsafe Agents
- 2025SafeAgent: Safeguarding LLM Agents via an Automated Risk Simulator