The Epistemological Consequences of Large Language Models: Rethinking collective intelligence and institutional knowledge

We examine epistemological threats posed by human and LLM interaction. We develop collective epistemology as a theory of epistemic warrant distributed across human collectives, using bounded rationality and dual process theory as background. We distinguish internalist justification, defined as reflective understanding of why a proposition is true, from externalist justification, defined as reliable transmission of truths. Both are necessary for collective rationality, but only internalist justification produces reflective knowledge. We specify reflective knowledge as follows: agents understand the evaluative basis of a claim, when that basis is unavailable agents consistently assess the reliability of truth sources, and agents have a duty to apply these standards within their domains of competence. We argue that LLMs approximate externalist reliabilism because they can reliably transmit information whose justificatory basis is established elsewhere, but they do not themselves possess reflective justification. Widespread outsourcing of reflective work to reliable LLM outputs can weaken reflective standards of justification, disincentivize comprehension, and reduce agents' capacity to meet professional and civic epistemic duties. To mitigate these risks, we propose a three tier norm program that includes an epistemic interaction model for individual use, institutional and organizational frameworks that seed and enforce norms for epistemically optimal outcomes, and deontic constraints at organizational and or legislative levels that instantiate discursive norms and curb epistemic vices.