Private Memorization Editing: Turning Memorization into a Defense to Strengthen Data Privacy in Large Language Models
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) memorize, and thus, among huge amounts of uncontrolled data, may memorize Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which should not be stored and, consequently, not leaked. In this paper, we introduce Private Memorization Editing (PME), an approach for preventing private data leakage that turns an apparent limitation, that is, the LLMs' memorization ability, into a powerful privacy defense strategy. While attacks against LLMs have been performed exploiting previous knowledge regarding their training data, our approach aims to exploit the same kind of knowledge in order to make a model more robust. We detect a memorized PII and then mitigate the memorization of PII by editing a model knowledge of its training data. We verify that our procedure does not affect the underlying language model while making it more robust against privacy Training Data Extraction attacks. We demonstrate that PME can effectively reduce the number of leaked PII in a number of configurations, in some cases even reducing the accuracy of the privacy attacks to zero.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 23 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Jun 2025.
Builds on
23 of 40 references.
References · 23
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- 2016Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Modelscited by 2,281
- 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,189
- 2020Transformer Feed-Forward Layers Are Key-Value Memoriescited by 1,336
- 2022Mass-Editing Memory in a Transformercited by 1,001
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- 2023Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Modelscited by 434
11 more
- 2022Aging with GRACE: Lifelong Model Editing with Discrete Key-Value Adaptorscited by 271
- 2023Membership Inference Attacks against Language Models via Neighbourhood Comparisoncited by 258
- 2023Does Localization Inform Editing? Surprising Differences in Causality-Based Localization vs. Knowledge Editing in Language Modelscited by 243
- 2022Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information?cited by 200
- 2022What Does it Mean for a Language Model to Preserve Privacy?cited by 195
- 2022Quantifying Privacy Risks of Masked Language Models Using Membership Inference Attackscited by 175
- 2024Measuring memorization in language models via probabilistic extractioncited by 41
- 2023Do Localization Methods Actually Localize Memorized Data in LLMs? A Tale of Two Benchmarkscited by 29
- 2024Investigating the Impact of Data Contamination of Large Language Models in Text-to-SQL Translationcited by 21
- 2022How to Dissect a Muppet: The Structure of Transformer Embedding Spacescited by 20
- 2024Preserving Privacy in Large Language Models: A Survey on Current Threats and Solutionscited by 15
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 2; 2026: 5.
7 papers.
- 2025Privacy-R1: Privacy-Aware Multi-LLM Agent Collaboration via Reinforcement Learningcited by 6
- 2025Transmuting prompts into weightscited by 3
- 2026Do LLMs Really Memorize Personally Identifiable Information? Revisiting PII Leakage with a Cue-Controlled Memorization Frameworkcited by 3
- 2026Mitigating Memorization Where It Happenscited by 2
- 2026Burn-After-Use for Preventing Data Leakage through a Secure Multi-Tenant Architecture in Enterprise LLMcited by 1
- 2026Data-Free Privacy-Preserving for LLMs via Model Inversion and Selective Unlearningcited by 1
- 2026Cross-Lingual Transferability of Training Data Extraction Attacks to Recover Memorized PIIcited by 0
- 2026Cross-Lingual Transferability of Training Data Extraction Attacks to Recover Memorized PII5 Oct 2026
- 2026Mitigating Memorization Where It Happens9 Feb 2026
- 2026Data-Free Privacy-Preserving for LLMs via Model Inversion and Selective Unlearning22 Jan 2026
- 2026Burn-After-Use for Preventing Data Leakage through a Secure Multi-Tenant Architecture in Enterprise LLM10 Jan 2026
- 2026Do LLMs Really Memorize Personally Identifiable Information? Revisiting PII Leakage with a Cue-Controlled Memorization Framework7 Jan 2026
- 2025Privacy-R1: Privacy-Aware Multi-LLM Agent Collaboration via Reinforcement Learning16 Oct 2025
- 2025Transmuting prompts into weights9 Oct 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Unintended Memorization of Sensitive Information in Fine-Tuned Language Models
- 2025R.R.: Unveiling LLM Training Privacy through Recollection and Ranking
- 2023What can we learn from Data Leakage and Unlearning for Law?
- 2024Undesirable Memorization in Large Language Models: A Survey
- 2024Efficient and Private: Memorisation under differentially private parameter-efficient fine-tuning in language models
- 2025A Survey on Privacy Risks and Protection in Large Language Models
- 2025Privacy Auditing of Large Language Models
- 2026On the Recoverability of Private Information Unlearning in Large Language Models