Burn-After-Use for Preventing Data Leakage through a Secure Multi-Tenant Architecture in Enterprise LLM

This study presents a Secure Multi-Tenant Architecture (SMTA) combined with a novel concept Burn-After-Use (BAU) mechanism for enterprise LLM environments to effectively prevent data leakage. As institutions increasingly adopt LLMs across departments, the risks of data leakage have become a critical security and compliance concern. The proposed SMTA isolates LLM instances across departments and enforces rigorous context ownership boundaries within an internally deployed infrastructure. The BAU mechanism introduces data confidentiality by enforcing ephemeral conversational contexts that are automatically destroyed after use, preventing cross-session or cross-user inference. The evaluation to SMTA and BAU is through two sets of realistic and reproducible experiments comprising of 127 test iterations. One aspect of this experiment is to assess prompt-based and semantic leakage attacks in a multi-tenant architecture (Appendix A) across 55 infrastructure-level attack tests, including vector-database credential compromise and shared logging pipeline exposure. SMTA achieves 92% defense success rate, demonstrating strong semantic isolation while highlighting residual risks from credential misconfiguration and observability pipelines. Another aspect is to evaluate the robustness of BAU under realistic failure scenarios (Appendix B) using four empirical metrics: Local Residual Persistence Rate (LRPR), Remote Residual Persistence Rate (RRPR), Image Frame Exposure Rate (IFER), and Burn Timer Persistence Rate (BTPR). Across 72 test iterations, BAU achieves a 76.75% success rate in mitigating post-session leakage threats across the client, server, application, infrastructure, and cache layers. These results show that SMTA and BAU together enforce strict isolation, complete session ephemerality, strong confidentiality guarantees, non-persistence, and policy-aligned behavior for enterprise LLMs.