Not All Edges are Equally Robust: Evaluating the Robustness of Ranking-Based Federated Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
Federated Ranking Learning (FRL) is a state-of-the-art FL framework that stands out for its communication efficiency and resilience to poisoning attacks. It diverges from the traditional FL framework in two ways: 1) it leverages discrete rankings instead of gradient updates, significantly reducing communication costs and limiting the potential space for malicious updates, and 2) it uses majority voting on the server side to establish the global ranking, ensuring that individual updates have minimal influence since each client contributes only a single vote. These features enhance the system's scalability and position FRL as a promising paradigm for FL training. However, our analysis reveals that FRL is not inherently robust, as certain edges are particularly vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Through a theoretical investigation, we prove the existence of these vulnerable edges and establish a lower bound and an upper bound for identifying them in each layer. Based on this finding, we introduce a novel local model poisoning attack against FRL, namely the Vulnerable Edge Manipulation (VEM) attack. The VEM attack focuses on identifying and perturbing the most vulnerable edges in each layer and leveraging an optimization-based approach to maximize the attack's impact. Through extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, we demonstrate that our attack achieves an overall 53.23% attack impact and is 3.7x more impactful than existing methods. Our findings highlight significant vulnerabilities in ranking-based FL systems and underline the urgency for the development of new robust FL frameworks.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 27 of its 50 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Mar 2025.
Builds on
27 of 50 references.
References · 27
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15 more
- 2019Can You Really Backdoor Federated Learning?cited by 255
- 2019What's Hidden in a Randomly Weighted Neural Network?cited by 237
- 2018The Convergence of Sparsified Gradient Methodscited by 229
- 2018Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learningcited by 225
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- 2017Towards Poisoning of Deep Learning Algorithms with Back-gradient Optimizationcited by 197
- 2018Learning Latent Permutations with Gumbel-Sinkhorn Networkscited by 175
- 2020Learning from History for Byzantine Robust Optimizationcited by 137
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- 2019Byzantine-Robust Federated Machine Learning through Adaptive Model Averagingcited by 70
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- 2013Big Neural Networks Waste Capacitycited by 10
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- 2023AGRAMPLIFIER: Defending Federated Learning Against Poisoning Attacks Through Local Update Amplificationcited by 5
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 1.
4 papers.
- 2025BiMark: Unbiased Multilayer Watermarking for Large Language Modelscited by 21
- 2025Character-Level Perturbations Disrupt LLM Watermarkscited by 9
- 2025Performance Guaranteed Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning: A Sliding Mode Approachcited by 0
- 2026ARES: Scalable and Practical Gradient Inversion Attack in Federated Learning through Activation Recoverycited by 0
- 2026ARES: Scalable and Practical Gradient Inversion Attack in Federated Learning through Activation Recovery18 Mar 2026
- 2025Character-Level Perturbations Disrupt LLM Watermarks11 Sep 2025
- 2025BiMark: Unbiased Multilayer Watermarking for Large Language Models19 Jun 2025
- 2025Performance Guaranteed Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning: A Sliding Mode Approach22 May 2025