Performance Guaranteed Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning: A Sliding Mode Approach
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Abstract (arXiv)
Manipulation of local training data and local updates, i.e., the poisoning attack, is the main threat arising from the collaborative nature of the federated learning (FL) paradigm. Most existing poisoning attacks aim to manipulate local data/models in a way that causes denial-of-service (DoS) issues. In this paper, we introduce a novel attack method, named Federated Learning Sliding Attack (FedSA) scheme, aiming at precisely introducing the extent of poisoning in a subtle controlled manner. It operates with a predefined objective, such as reducing global model's prediction accuracy by 10%. FedSA integrates robust nonlinear control-Sliding Mode Control (SMC) theory with model poisoning attacks. It can manipulate the updates from malicious clients to drive the global model towards a compromised state, achieving this at a controlled and inconspicuous rate. Additionally, leveraging the robust control properties of FedSA allows precise control over the convergence bounds, enabling the attacker to set the global accuracy of the poisoned model to any desired level. Experimental results demonstrate that FedSA can accurately achieve a predefined global accuracy with fewer malicious clients while maintaining a high level of stealth and adjustable learning rates.
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References · 20
- 2016Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Datacited by 7,669
- 2018How To Backdoor Federated Learningcited by 765
- 2018Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Ratescited by 711
- 2019Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learningcited by 493
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- 2018The Hidden Vulnerability of Distributed Learning in Byzantiumcited by 329
- 2019A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learningcited by 288
- 2019Can You Really Backdoor Federated Learning?cited by 255
- 2018Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learningcited by 225
- 2017Towards Poisoning of Deep Learning Algorithms with Back-gradient Optimizationcited by 197
- 2019Fall of Empires: Breaking Byzantine-tolerant SGD by Inner Product Manipulationcited by 141
8 more
- 2020Learning from History for Byzantine Robust Optimizationcited by 137
- 2017Learning Feature Pyramids for Human Pose Estimationcited by 57
- 2018Universal Multi-Party Poisoning Attackscited by 17
- 2022FL-Defender: Combating Targeted Attacks in Federated Learningcited by 15
- 2023Denial-of-Service or Fine-Grained Control: Towards Flexible Model Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learningcited by 10
- 2020PrivColl: Practical Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Machine Learningcited by 8
- 2023AGRAMPLIFIER: Defending Federated Learning Against Poisoning Attacks Through Local Update Amplificationcited by 5
- 2025Not All Edges are Equally Robust: Evaluating the Robustness of Ranking-Based Federated Learningcited by 4
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