Can AI Model the Complexities of Human Moral Decision-Making? A Qualitative Study of Kidney Allocation Decisions
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Abstract (arXiv)
A growing body of work in Ethical AI attempts to capture human moral judgments through simple computational models. The key question we address in this work is whether such simple AI models capture {the critical} nuances of moral decision-making by focusing on the use case of kidney allocation. We conducted twenty interviews where participants explained their rationale for their judgments about who should receive a kidney. We observe participants: (a) value patients' morally-relevant attributes to different degrees; (b) use diverse decision-making processes, citing heuristics to reduce decision complexity; (c) can change their opinions; (d) sometimes lack confidence in their decisions (e.g., due to incomplete information); and (e) express enthusiasm and concern regarding AI assisting humans in kidney allocation decisions. Based on these findings, we discuss challenges of computationally modeling moral judgments {as a stand-in for human input}, highlight drawbacks of current approaches, and suggest future directions to address these issues.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 32 of its 155 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Mar 2025.
Builds on
32 of 155 references.
References · 32
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20 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 4; 2026: 5.
9 papers.
- 2025Moral Change or Noise? On Problems of Aligning AI With Temporally Unstable Human Feedbackcited by 5
- 2026Position: Machine Learning for Heart Transplant Allocation Policy Optimization Should Account for Incentivescited by 3
- 2025Who Gets the Kidney? Human-AI Alignment, Indecision, and Moral Valuescited by 2
- 2025Towards Cognitively-Faithful Decision-Making Models to Improve AI Alignmentcited by 2
- 2025Evaluating Large Language Models for Fair and Reliable Organ Allocationcited by 1
- 2026The Consensus Trap: Dissecting Subjectivity and the "Ground Truth" Illusion in Data Annotationcited by 1
- 2026Learning What Evaluators Value: A Reliable Approach to Modeling Evaluator Preferencescited by 0
- 2026Position: We Need Practical AI Alignment Methods to Mirror Human Reasoningcited by 0
- 2026Preference Elicitation for Policy Optimization and Application to Aligning Heart Transplantation with Human Valuescited by 0
- 2026Preference Elicitation for Policy Optimization and Application to Aligning Heart Transplantation with Human Values29 Jul 2026
- 2026Position: We Need Practical AI Alignment Methods to Mirror Human Reasoning20 Jul 2026
- 2026Learning What Evaluators Value: A Reliable Approach to Modeling Evaluator Preferences15 May 2026
- 2026The Consensus Trap: Dissecting Subjectivity and the "Ground Truth" Illusion in Data Annotation11 Feb 2026
- 2026Position: Machine Learning for Heart Transplant Allocation Policy Optimization Should Account for Incentives4 Feb 2026
- 2025Moral Change or Noise? On Problems of Aligning AI With Temporally Unstable Human Feedback13 Nov 2025
- 2025Towards Cognitively-Faithful Decision-Making Models to Improve AI Alignment4 Sep 2025
- 2025Who Gets the Kidney? Human-AI Alignment, Indecision, and Moral Values30 May 2025
- 2025Evaluating Large Language Models for Fair and Reliable Organ Allocation29 Mar 2025