The Elicitation Game: Evaluating Capability Elicitation Techniques
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Abstract (arXiv)
Capability evaluations are required to understand and regulate AI systems that may be deployed or further developed. Therefore, it is important that evaluations provide an accurate estimation of an AI system's capabilities. However, in numerous cases, previously latent capabilities have been elicited from models, sometimes long after initial release. Accordingly, substantial efforts have been made to develop methods for eliciting latent capabilities from models. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of capability elicitation techniques by intentionally training model organisms -- language models with hidden capabilities that are revealed by a password. We introduce a novel method for training model organisms, based on circuit-breaking, which is more robust to elicitation techniques than standard password-locked models. We focus on elicitation techniques based on prompting and activation steering, and compare these to fine-tuning methods. Prompting techniques can elicit the actual capability of both password-locked and circuit-broken model organisms in the MCQA setting, while steering fails to do so. For a code-generation task, only fine-tuning can elicit the hidden capabilities of our novel model organism. Additionally, our results suggest that combining techniques improves elicitation. Still, if possible, fine-tuning should be the method of choice to improve the trustworthiness of capability evaluations.
Key facts. Cited by 15 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 36 of its 68 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Feb 2025.
Builds on
36 of 68 references.
References · 36
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 4; 2026: 11.
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- 2026A Decision-Theoretic Formalisation of Steganography With Applications to LLM Monitoringcited by 6
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- 2026A Decision-Theoretic Formalisation of Steganography With Applications to LLM Monitoring26 Feb 2026
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- 2025Prompt Attacks Reveal Superficial Knowledge Removal in Unlearning Methods11 Jun 2025
- 2025Distillation Robustifies Unlearning6 Jun 2025
- 2026Frontier Coding Agents Can Now Implement an AlphaZero Self-Play Machine Learning Pipeline For Connect Four That Performs Comparably to an External Solvercited by 0
- 2026AI Security Policy Should Assess Systems, Not Only Modelscited by 0
- 2026Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Responsecited by 0
- 2026Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Response28 Jul 2026
- 2026AI Security Policy Should Assess Systems, Not Only Models10 May 2026
- 2026Frontier Coding Agents Can Now Implement an AlphaZero Self-Play Machine Learning Pipeline For Connect Four That Performs Comparably to an External Solver27 Apr 2026
- 2026Shaping capabilities with token-level data filteringcited by 11
- 2025The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Prioritiescited by 9
- 2026A Decision-Theoretic Formalisation of Steganography With Applications to LLM Monitoringcited by 6
- 2025Locket: Robust Feature-Locking Technique for Language Modelscited by 1
- 2026LLMs Can Leak Training Data But Do They Want To? A Propensity-Aware Evaluation of Memorization in LLMscited by 1
- 2026Modular Pretraining Enables Access Controlcited by 1
- 2026Reference-Grafting Matches Fine-Tuning at Eliciting Sandbagged Capabilitiescited by 1
- 2026A Causal Model for Locating and Unlocking Sandbagging in Model Organismscited by 1
- 2026Activation Flow: Manufacturing Activations for Steeringcited by 0
- 2026Activation Flow: Manufacturing Activations for Steering26 Sep 2026
- 2026A Causal Model for Locating and Unlocking Sandbagging in Model Organisms29 Aug 2026
- 2026Reference-Grafting Matches Fine-Tuning at Eliciting Sandbagged Capabilities29 Aug 2026
- 2026Modular Pretraining Enables Access Control9 Jul 2026
- 2026LLMs Can Leak Training Data But Do They Want To? A Propensity-Aware Evaluation of Memorization in LLMs4 Jun 2026
- 2026A Decision-Theoretic Formalisation of Steganography With Applications to LLM Monitoring26 Feb 2026
- 2026Shaping capabilities with token-level data filtering29 Jan 2026
- 2025Locket: Robust Feature-Locking Technique for Language Models14 Oct 2025
- 2025The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities25 Jun 2025