mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Trojan Detection in Large Language Models: Insights from The Trojan Detection Challenge

arXiv 2404.13660 ↗First posted 21 Apr 2024cs.CLcited by 14

On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks

Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various domains, but their vulnerability to trojan or backdoor attacks poses significant security risks. This paper explores the challenges and insights gained from the Trojan Detection Competition 2023 (TDC2023), which focused on identifying and evaluating trojan attacks on LLMs. We investigate the difficulty of distinguishing between intended and unintended triggers, as well as the feasibility of reverse engineering trojans in real-world scenarios. Our comparative analysis of various trojan detection methods reveals that achieving high Recall scores is significantly more challenging than obtaining high Reverse-Engineering Attack Success Rate (REASR) scores. The top-performing methods in the competition achieved Recall scores around 0.16, comparable to a simple baseline of randomly sampling sentences from a distribution similar to the given training prefixes. This finding raises questions about the detectability and recoverability of trojans inserted into the model, given only the harmful targets. Despite the inability to fully solve the problem, the competition has led to interesting observations about the viability of trojan detection and improved techniques for optimizing LLM input prompts. The phenomenon of unintended triggers and the difficulty in distinguishing them from intended triggers highlights the need for further research into the robustness and interpretability of LLMs. The TDC2023 has provided valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with trojan detection in LLMs, laying the groundwork for future research in this area to ensure their safety and reliability in real-world applications.

Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 12 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Apr 2024.

Builds on

12 of 23 references.

References · 12

  1. 2023Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Modelscited by 12,865
  2. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  3. 2023Pythia: A Suite for Analyzing Large Language Models Across Training and Scalingcited by 1,734
  4. 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Modelscited by 983
  5. 2019Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLPcited by 709
  6. 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learnedcited by 702
  7. 2023Hard Prompts Made Easy: Gradient-Based Discrete Optimization for Prompt Tuning and Discoverycited by 329
  8. 2021Gradient-based Adversarial Attacks against Text Transformerscited by 233
  9. 2021Adversarial GLUE: A Multi-Task Benchmark for Robustness Evaluation of Language Modelscited by 227
  10. 2023Automatically Auditing Large Language Models via Discrete Optimizationcited by 187
  11. 2024Accelerating Greedy Coordinate Gradient and General Prompt Optimization via Probe Samplingcited by 33
  12. 2023From Shortcuts to Triggers: Backdoor Defense with Denoised PoEcited by 26

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 11; 2026: 1.

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