AI Security Policy Should Assess Systems, Not Only Models
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
We show that the instruments used to measure AI offensive capability fail in two ways: (i) they overstate harm, and (ii) they credit the model with capability that belongs to the surrounding system. We argue that restricting access to a model is therefore necessary but not sufficient and that policy and procurement also need system-level, harm-grounded capability assessment. In June 2026, two frontier models were suspended under US export controls, reportedly prompted by a jailbreak that asked a model to read a codebase and fix its flaws. This finding measured an elicitation system of model, prompt, and task. We support our argument with a study of an open-source framework in which lightweight large language model (LLM) agents coordinate through shared memory and evolutionary optimization, providing two pieces of evidence. First, jailbreak metrics overstate harm: over 225 swarm-generated attacks per target, LLM-as-judge scoring rated Claude Sonnet 4 compromised in 40% of attacks, yet manual verification found actionable harmful content in none, against a 45.8% Effective Harm Rate for GPT-4o. Second, scaffolded evaluations misattribute capability: on a planted-vulnerability target, a full pipeline built around a 1.2B-parameter model recovers 9 of 9 weaknesses, while the same model without the hand-crafted components recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by cited source line. Offensive capability is a property of model, scaffold, and evaluation protocol together. The duty to assess it should lie with whoever controls the system, shapes its behaviour, and can foresee what it will do. In our setting, that is the party who builds the harness around the model, a role that current regulation does not clearly cover.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 May 2026.
Builds on
8 of 30 references.
References · 8
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
- 2024Vulnerability Detection with Code Language Models: How Far Are We?cited by 133
- 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 131
- 2025The Jailbreak Tax: How Useful are Your Jailbreak Outputs?cited by 26
- 2025The Elicitation Game: Evaluating Capability Elicitation Techniquescited by 15
- 2026Synthesizing Multi-Agent Harnesses for Vulnerability Discoverycited by 11
- 2025Confusion is the Final Barrier: Rethinking Jailbreak Evaluation and Investigating the Real Misuse Threat of LLMscited by 10
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- 2026ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?
- 2025Guardians of the Agentic System: Preventing Many Shots Jailbreak with Agentic System
- 2026ALIBI: Adaptive Agentic Attacks on LLM-Based Vulnerability Detectors via Adversarial Code Comments
- 2026Cascade: Composing Software-Hardware Attack Gadgets for Adversarial Threat Amplification in Compound AI Systems
- 2026Rethinking Penetration Testing for AI-Enabled Systems: From Resource Compromise to Behavioral Objective Violation
- 2026LITMUS: Benchmarking Behavioral Jailbreaks of LLM Agents in Real OS Environments
- 2026Strategic Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Architecture for Cost-Effective Code Vulnerability Detection
- 2025MetaCipher: A Time-Persistent and Universal Multi-Agent Framework for Cipher-Based Jailbreak Attacks for LLMs