Disentangling Safe and Unsafe Corruptions via Anisotropy and Locality
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
State-of-the-art machine learning systems are vulnerable to small perturbations to their input, where ``small'' is defined according to a threat model that assigns a positive threat to each perturbation. Most prior works define a task-agnostic, isotropic, and global threat, like the ℓp norm, where the magnitude of the perturbation fully determines the degree of the threat and neither the direction of the attack nor its position in space matter. However, common corruptions in computer vision, such as blur, compression, or occlusions, are not well captured by such threat models. This paper proposes a novel threat model called textttProjected Displacement (PD) to study robustness beyond existing isotropic and global threat models. The proposed threat model measures the threat of a perturbation via its alignment with textitunsafe directions, defined as directions in the input space along which a perturbation of sufficient magnitude changes the ground truth class label. Unsafe directions are identified locally for each input based on observed training data. In this way, the PD threat model exhibits anisotropy and locality. Experiments on Imagenet-1k data indicate that, for any input, the set of perturbations with small PD threat includes textitsafe perturbations of large ℓp norm that preserve the true label, such as noise, blur and compression, while simultaneously excluding textitunsafe perturbations that alter the true label. Unlike perceptual threat models based on embeddings of large-vision models, the PD threat model can be readily computed for arbitrary classification tasks without pre-training or finetuning. Further additional task annotation such as sensitivity to image regions or concept hierarchies can be easily integrated into the assessment of threat and thus the PD threat model presents practitioners with a flexible, task-driven threat specification.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 46 of its 55 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Jan 2025.
Builds on
46 of 55 references.
References · 46
- 2018The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Deep Features as a Perceptual Metriccited by 11,177
- 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,364
- 2017Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attackscited by 6,415
- 2013Intriguing properties of neural networkscited by 5,155
- 2019Benchmarking Neural Network Robustness to Common Corruptions and Perturbationscited by 2,877
- 2024SAM 2: Segment Anything in Images and Videoscited by 2,863
- 2016Adversarial examples in the physical worldcited by 1,769
- 2019Theoretically Principled Trade-off between Robustness and Accuracycited by 1,517
- 2020Reliable evaluation of adversarial robustness with an ensemble of diverse parameter-free attackscited by 1,451
- 2015The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settingscited by 790
- 2020RobustBench: a standardized adversarial robustness benchmarkcited by 661
- 2017Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer adversarial polytopecited by 567
34 more
- 2020On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defensescited by 555
- 2017Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methodscited by 546
- 2020Noise or Signal: The Role of Image Backgrounds in Object Recognitioncited by 343
- 2023DreamSim: Learning New Dimensions of Human Visual Similarity using Synthetic Datacited by 337
- 2020Uncovering the Limits of Adversarial Training against Norm-Bounded Adversarial Examplescited by 278
- 2018Generalisation in humans and deep neural networkscited by 237
- 2021Improving Robustness using Generated Datacited by 234
- 2018Spatially Transformed Adversarial Examplescited by 195
- 2019Making an Invisibility Cloak: Real World Adversarial Attacks on Object Detectorscited by 155
- 2019Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Drivingcited by 152
- 2020Perceptual Adversarial Robustness: Defense Against Unseen Threat Modelscited by 137
- 2021Advances in adversarial attacks and defenses in computer vision: A surveycited by 127
- 2019Imperceptible, Robust, and Targeted Adversarial Examples for Automatic Speech Recognitioncited by 124
- 20223D Common Corruptions and Data Augmentationcited by 119
- 2017A Study and Comparison of Human and Deep Learning Recognition Performance Under Visual Distortionscited by 108
- 2021On Interaction Between Augmentations and Corruptions in Natural Corruption Robustnesscited by 97
- 2023A Comprehensive Study on Robustness of Image Classification Models: Benchmarking and Rethinkingcited by 85
- 2022Frequency-driven Imperceptible Adversarial Attack on Semantic Similaritycited by 77
- 2018Excessive Invariance Causes Adversarial Vulnerabilitycited by 66
- 2022A Light Recipe to Train Robust Vision Transformerscited by 64
- 2018On the Suitability of Lp-norms for Creating and Preventing Adversarial Examplescited by 58
- 2018Motivating the Rules of the Game for Adversarial Example Researchcited by 57
- 2020Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbationscited by 55
- 2017Geometric robustness of deep networks: analysis and improvementcited by 45
- 2019E-LPIPS: Robust Perceptual Image Similarity via Random Transformation Ensemblescited by 45
- 2021Exploring Adversarial Robustness of Multi-Sensor Perception Systems in Self Drivingcited by 45
- 2024Adversarial Robustness Limits via Scaling-Law and Human-Alignment Studiescited by 38
- 2023R-LPIPS: An Adversarially Robust Perceptual Similarity Metriccited by 28
- 2023Improving the Accuracy-Robustness Trade-Off of Classifiers via Adaptive Smoothingcited by 18
- 2021Adversarial Robustness with Non-uniform Perturbationscited by 17
- 2023LipSim: A Provably Robust Perceptual Similarity Metriccited by 15
- 2023Attacking Perceptual Similarity Metricscited by 10
- 2023Benchmarking Robustness to Adversarial Image Obfuscationscited by 8
- 2023Scaling Compute Is Not All You Need for Adversarial Robustnesscited by 6
Built on by
Not cited yet.