Intuitions of Compromise: Utilitarianism vs. Contractualism
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Abstract (arXiv)
What is the best compromise in a situation where different people value different things? The most commonly accepted method for answering this question -- in fields across the behavioral and social sciences, decision theory, philosophy, and artificial intelligence development -- is simply to add up utilities associated with the different options and pick the solution with the largest sum. This ``utilitarian'' approach seems like the obvious, theory-neutral way of approaching the problem. But there is an important, though often-ignored, alternative: a ``contractualist'' approach, which advocates for an agreement-driven method of deciding. Remarkably, no research has presented empirical evidence directly comparing the intuitive plausibility of these two approaches. In this paper, we systematically explore the proposals suggested by each algorithm (the ``Utilitarian Sum'' and the contractualist ''Nash Product''), using a paradigm that applies those algorithms to aggregating preferences across groups in a social decision-making context. While the dominant approach to value aggregation up to now has been utilitarian, we find that people strongly prefer the aggregations recommended by the contractualist algorithm. Finally, we compare the judgments of large language models (LLMs) to that of our (human) participants, finding important misalignment between model and human preferences.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 67 of its 206 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Oct 2024.
Builds on
67 of 206 references.
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- 2025Resource Rational Contractualism Should Guide AI Alignment20 Jun 2025