Quantifying stability of non-power-seeking in artificial agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
We investigate the question: if an AI agent is known to be safe in one setting, is it also safe in a new setting similar to the first? This is a core question of AI alignment--we train and test models in a certain environment, but deploy them in another, and we need to guarantee that models that seem safe in testing remain so in deployment. Our notion of safety is based on power-seeking--an agent which seeks power is not safe. In particular, we focus on a crucial type of power-seeking: resisting shutdown. We model agents as policies for Markov decision processes, and show (in two cases of interest) that not resisting shutdown is "stable": if an MDP has certain policies which don't avoid shutdown, the corresponding policies for a similar MDP also don't avoid shutdown. We also show that there are natural cases where safety is _not_ stable--arbitrarily small perturbations may result in policies which never shut down. In our first case of interest--near-optimal policies--we use a bisimulation metric on MDPs to prove that small perturbations won't make the agent take longer to shut down. Our second case of interest is policies for MDPs satisfying certain constraints which hold for various models (including language models). Here, we demonstrate a quantitative bound on how fast the probability of not shutting down can increase: by defining a metric on MDPs; proving that the probability of not shutting down, as a function on MDPs, is lower semicontinuous; and bounding how quickly this function decreases.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Jan 2024.
Builds on
16 of 40 references.
References · 16
- 2022Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervisioncited by 733
- 2023Role-Play with Large Language Modelscited by 290
- 2019Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systemscited by 250
- 2022The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspectivecited by 246
- 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 207
- 2022Talking About Large Language Modelscited by 174
- 2019Optimal Policies Tend to Seek Powercited by 115
- 2019Reward Tampering Problems and Solutions in Reinforcement Learning: A Causal Influence Diagram Perspectivecited by 107
- 2018The Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes from the Evolutionary Computation and Artificial Life Research Communitiescited by 78
- 2021Towards Robust Bisimulation Metric Learningcited by 49
- 2021Metrics and continuity in reinforcement learningcited by 26
- 2023Power-seeking can be probable and predictive for trained agentscited by 23
4 more
- 2021How RL Agents Behave When Their Actions Are Modifiedcited by 10
- 2023Human Control: Definitions and Algorithmscited by 10
- 2016Death and Suicide in Universal Artificial Intelligencecited by 9
- 2019Bisimulation for Feller-Dynkin Processescited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Core Safety Values for Provably Corrigible Agents
- 2026Epistemic Traps: Rational Misalignment Driven by Model Misspecification
- 2026Safety Does Not Compose: Non-Decaying Loop State for Autonomous LLM Agents
- 2025The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an AI Agent's Safety and Autonomy
- 2026SafetyDrift: Predicting When AI Agents Cross the Line Before They Actually Do
- 2026Position: AI Safety Requires Effective Controllability
- 2024From homeostasis to resource sharing: Biologically and economically aligned multi-objective multi-agent gridworld-based AI safety benchmarks
- 2026Position: Safety and Fairness in Agentic AI Depend on Interaction Topology, Not on Model Scale or Alignment