How RL Agents Behave When Their Actions Are Modified
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Abstract (arXiv)
Reinforcement learning in complex environments may require supervision to prevent the agent from attempting dangerous actions. As a result of supervisor intervention, the executed action may differ from the action specified by the policy. How does this affect learning? We present the Modified-Action Markov Decision Process, an extension of the MDP model that allows actions to differ from the policy. We analyze the asymptotic behaviours of common reinforcement learning algorithms in this setting and show that they adapt in different ways: some completely ignore modifications while others go to various lengths in trying to avoid action modifications that decrease reward. By choosing the right algorithm, developers can prevent their agents from learning to circumvent interruptions or constraints, and better control agent responses to other kinds of action modification, like self-damage.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 8 of its 33 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Feb 2021.
Builds on
8 of 33 references.
References · 8
- 2017Evolution Strategies as a Scalable Alternative to Reinforcement Learningcited by 555
- 2017Safe Model-based Reinforcement Learning with Stability Guaranteescited by 347
- 2016Deep Reinforcement Learning for Robotic Manipulation with Asynchronous Off-Policy Updatescited by 342
- 2018Safe Exploration in Continuous Action Spacescited by 237
- 2015Fixed Point Quantization of Deep Convolutional Networkscited by 141
- 2017AI Safety Gridworldscited by 108
- 2017Trial without Error: Towards Safe Reinforcement Learning via Human Interventioncited by 102
- 2017Agent-Agnostic Human-in-the-Loop Reinforcement Learningcited by 23
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 3; 2023: 1; 2024: 1; 2025: 3; 2026: 1.
10 papers.
- 2021Alignment of Language Agentscited by 167
- 2022Towards Safe Reinforcement Learning with a Safety Editor Policycited by 28
- 2022Discovering Agentscited by 28
- 2023Reasoning about Causality in Gamescited by 20
- 2025Collaborate, Deliberate, Evaluate: How LLM Alignment Affects Coordinated Multi-Agent Outcomescited by 6
- 2022A Complete Criterion for Value of Information in Soluble Influence Diagramscited by 5
- 2024Quantifying stability of non-power-seeking in artificial agentscited by 2
- 2025Learning "Partner-Aware" Collaborators in Multi-Party Collaborationcited by 2
- 2025Governable AI: Provable Safety Under Extreme Threat Modelscited by 0
- 2026Flout at Your Own Risk: LLMs Struggle with Pragmatic Cooperativity Under Epistemic Asymmetrycited by 0
- 2026Flout at Your Own Risk: LLMs Struggle with Pragmatic Cooperativity Under Epistemic Asymmetry13 Jul 2026
- 2025Learning "Partner-Aware" Collaborators in Multi-Party Collaboration26 Oct 2025
- 2025Collaborate, Deliberate, Evaluate: How LLM Alignment Affects Coordinated Multi-Agent Outcomes7 Sep 2025
- 2025Governable AI: Provable Safety Under Extreme Threat Models28 Aug 2025
- 2024Quantifying stability of non-power-seeking in artificial agents7 Jan 2024
- 2023Reasoning about Causality in Games5 Jan 2023
- 2022Discovering Agents17 Aug 2022
- 2022A Complete Criterion for Value of Information in Soluble Influence Diagrams23 Feb 2022
- 2022Towards Safe Reinforcement Learning with a Safety Editor Policy28 Jan 2022
- 2021Alignment of Language Agents26 Mar 2021