mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

arXiv 2310.16048 ↗First posted 24 Oct 2023cs.AI cs.CL cs.CYcited by 35

On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Human values and AI feedback alignment

Abstract (arXiv)

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

Key facts. Cited by 35 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Human values and AI feedback alignment, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 12 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Oct 2023.

Builds on

12 of 27 references.

References · 12

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2023Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Modelscited by 12,865
  3. 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,846
  4. 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,634
  5. 2019Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferencescited by 2,124
  6. 2022LaMDA: Language Models for Dialog Applicationscited by 1,218
  7. 2018Model Cards for Model Reportingcited by 1,068
  8. 2021A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignmentcited by 1,023
  9. 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 743
  10. 2020Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignmentcited by 443
  11. 2019Artificial Intelligence: the global landscape of ethics guidelinescited by 107
  12. 2017A Voting-Based System for Ethical Decision Makingcited by 55

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2023: 2; 2024: 11; 2025: 14; 2026: 8.

35 papers.

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By area:

  1. 2023A Survey of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 259
  2. 2024A Roadmap to Pluralistic Alignmentcited by 175
  3. 2023Distributional Preference Learning: Understanding and Accounting for Hidden Context in RLHFcited by 125
  4. 2024Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedbackcited by 95
  5. 2025Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 53
  6. 2024Axioms for AI Alignment from Human Feedbackcited by 50
  7. 2024Beyond Preferences in AI Alignmentcited by 46
  8. 2024Style Outweighs Substance: Failure Modes of LLM Judges in Alignment Benchmarkingcited by 35
  9. 2024AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functionscited by 33
  10. 2024Mapping Social Choice Theory to RLHFcited by 26
  11. 2024Improving Context-Aware Preference Modeling for Language Modelscited by 22
  12. 2025Distortion of AI Alignment: Does Preference Optimization Optimize for Preferences?cited by 20
23 more
  1. 2025Jackpot! Alignment as a Maximal Lotterycited by 17
  2. 2025Virtual Agent Economiescited by 17
  3. 2025Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontierscited by 14
  4. 2025Pairwise Calibrated Rewards for Pluralistic Alignmentcited by 12
  5. 2025Fundamental Limits of Game-Theoretic LLM Alignment: Smith Consistency and Preference Matchingcited by 10
  6. 2024Representative Social Choice: From Learning Theory to AI Alignmentcited by 8
  7. 2024Adaptive Alignment: Dynamic Preference Adjustments via Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning for Pluralistic AIcited by 6
  8. 2025Theoretical Tensions in RLHF: Reconciling Empirical Success with Inconsistencies in Social Choice Theorycited by 6
  9. 2025The Right to AIcited by 3
  10. 2025Beyond RLHF and NLHF: Population-Proportional Alignment under an Axiomatic Frameworkcited by 3
  11. 2024Can an AI Agent Safely Run a Government? Existence of Probably Approximately Aligned Policiescited by 1
  12. 2025Beyond Pairwise: Empowering LLM Alignment With Ranked Choice Modelingcited by 1
  13. 2026Power and Limitations of Aggregation in Compound AI Systemscited by 1
  14. 2025Embracing Dialectic Intersubjectivity: Coordination of Different Perspectives in Content Analysis with LLM Persona Simulationcited by 0
  15. 2025Balancing Innovation and Integrity: AI Integration in Liberal Arts College Administrationcited by 0
  16. 2025Synthetic media and computational capitalism: towards a critical theory of artificial intelligencecited by 0
  17. 2026Fair Agents: Balancing Multistakeholder Alignment in Multi-Agent Personalization Systemscited by 0
  18. 2026Variance-aware Reward Modeling with Anchor Guidancecited by 0
  19. 2026Curriculum Group Policy Optimization: Adaptive Sampling for Unleashing the Potential of Text-to-Image Generationcited by 0
  20. 2026Efficient Exploration for Iterative Nash Preference Optimizationcited by 0
  21. 2026AI Alignment From Social Choice Perspectivescited by 0
  22. 2026AI Alignment through a Game-theoretic Lens: A Surveycited by 0
  23. 2026Moral Competence Before Moral Content: Why LLM Agents Lack the Prerequisites for Coherent Alignmentcited by 0

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2024AI Alignment through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback? Contradictions and Limitations
  2. 2026Algorithmic Impact Reveals the Hidden Social Choice Structure of Alignment
  3. 2025Maximizing the efficiency of human feedback in AI alignment: a comparative analysis
  4. 2024Moral Alignment for LLM Agents
  5. 2024MaxMin-RLHF: Alignment with Diverse Human Preferences
  6. 2026Constructive Alignment: Governing Preference Dynamics in Human-AI Interaction
  7. 2024Combining Theory of Mind and Kindness for Self-Supervised Human-AI Alignment
  8. 2024Democratizing Reward Design for Personal and Representative Value-Alignment