Conflicting Interactions Among Protection Mechanisms for Machine Learning Models
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Abstract (arXiv)
Nowadays, systems based on machine learning (ML) are widely used in different domains. Given their popularity, ML models have become targets for various attacks. As a result, research at the intersection of security/privacy and ML has flourished. Typically such work has focused on individual types of security/privacy concerns and mitigations thereof. However, in real-life deployments, an ML model will need to be protected against several concerns simultaneously. A protection mechanism optimal for one security or privacy concern may interact negatively with mechanisms intended to address other concerns. Despite its practical relevance, the potential for such conflicts has not been studied adequately. We first provide a framework for analyzing such "conflicting interactions". We then focus on systematically analyzing pairwise interactions between protection mechanisms for one concern, model and data ownership verification, with two other classes of ML protection mechanisms: differentially private training, and robustness against model evasion. We find that several pairwise interactions result in conflicts. We explore potential approaches for avoiding such conflicts. First, we study the effect of hyperparameter relaxations, finding that there is no sweet spot balancing the performance of both protection mechanisms. Second, we explore if modifying one type of protection mechanism (ownership verification) so as to decouple it from factors that may be impacted by a conflicting mechanism (differentially private training or robustness to model evasion) can avoid conflict. We show that this approach can avoid the conflict between ownership verification mechanisms when combined with differentially private training, but has no effect on robustness to model evasion. Finally, we identify the gaps in the landscape of studying interactions between other types of ML protection mechanisms.
Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 44 of its 65 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Jul 2022.
Builds on
44 of 65 references.
References · 44
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32 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 1; 2024: 4; 2025: 5; 2026: 1.
12 papers.
- 2024Reliable Model Watermarking: Defending Against Theft without Compromising on Evasioncited by 9
- 2022On the Robustness of Dataset Inferencecited by 8
- 2023SoK: Unintended Interactions among Machine Learning Defenses and Riskscited by 6
- 2025Confidential LLM Inference: Performance and Cost Across CPU and GPU TEEscited by 5
- 2024Fortify Your Foundations: Practical Privacy and Security for Foundation Model Deployments In The Cloudcited by 4
- 2025Robustness questions the interpretability of graph neural networks: what to do?cited by 4
- 2024Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Fault Detection and Diagnosis: A Comprehensive Benchmark on the Tennessee Eastman Processcited by 2
- 2024Combining Machine Learning Defenses without Conflictscited by 2
- 2025Evading Data Provenance in Deep Neural Networkscited by 2
- 2025Amulet: a Python Library for Assessing Interactions Among ML Defenses and Riskscited by 1
- 2025Framework GNN-AID: Graph Neural Network Analysis Interpretation and Defensecited by 0
- 2026SoK: Colluding Adversaries in Machine Learning Pipelinescited by 0
- 2026SoK: Colluding Adversaries in Machine Learning Pipelines8 Jun 2026
- 2025Confidential LLM Inference: Performance and Cost Across CPU and GPU TEEs23 Sep 2025
- 2025Amulet: a Python Library for Assessing Interactions Among ML Defenses and Risks15 Sep 2025
- 2025Evading Data Provenance in Deep Neural Networks1 Aug 2025
- 2025Framework GNN-AID: Graph Neural Network Analysis Interpretation and Defense6 May 2025
- 2025Robustness questions the interpretability of graph neural networks: what to do?5 May 2025
- 2024Combining Machine Learning Defenses without Conflicts14 Nov 2024
- 2024Fortify Your Foundations: Practical Privacy and Security for Foundation Model Deployments In The Cloud8 Oct 2024
- 2024Reliable Model Watermarking: Defending Against Theft without Compromising on Evasion21 Apr 2024
- 2024Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Fault Detection and Diagnosis: A Comprehensive Benchmark on the Tennessee Eastman Process20 Mar 2024
- 2023SoK: Unintended Interactions among Machine Learning Defenses and Risks7 Dec 2023
- 2022On the Robustness of Dataset Inference24 Oct 2022