Lazy-CFR: fast and near optimal regret minimization for extensive games with imperfect information
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Abstract (arXiv)
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is the most popular algorithm on solving two-player zero-sum extensive games with imperfect information and achieves state-of-the-art performance in practice. However, the performance of CFR is not fully understood, since empirical results on the regret are much better than the upper bound proved in citezinkevich2008regret. Another issue is that CFR has to traverse the whole game tree in each round, which is time-consuming in large scale games. In this paper, we present a novel technique, lazy update, which can avoid traversing the whole game tree in CFR, as well as a novel analysis on the regret of CFR with lazy update. Our analysis can also be applied to the vanilla CFR, resulting in a much tighter regret bound than that in citezinkevich2008regret. Inspired by lazy update, we further present a novel CFR variant, named Lazy-CFR. Compared to traversing O(|I|) information sets in vanilla CFR, Lazy-CFR needs only to traverse O(√|I|) information sets per round while keeping the regret bound almost the same, where I is the class of all information sets. As a result, Lazy-CFR shows better convergence result compared with vanilla CFR. Experimental results consistently show that Lazy-CFR outperforms the vanilla CFR significantly.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 10 Oct 2018.
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Citing papers per year: 2022: 3; 2023: 2; 2024: 0; 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
8 papers.
- 2022Near-Optimal Learning of Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Informationcited by 26
- 2022Efficient Phi-Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games via Online Mirror Descentcited by 15
- 2022Sample-Efficient Learning of Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Gamescited by 7
- 2023Learning not to Regretcited by 2
- 2025Beyond Outcome-Based Imperfect-Recall: Higher-Resolution Abstractions for Imperfect-Information Gamescited by 1
- 2023Accelerating Nash Equilibrium Convergence in Monte Carlo Settings Through Counterfactual Value Based Fictitious Playcited by 0
- 2025Meta-Learning in Self-Play Regret Minimizationcited by 0
- 2026CFR without Unbiasedness: Deterministic Guarantees for Persistent Public-Chance Schedulescited by 0
- 2026CFR without Unbiasedness: Deterministic Guarantees for Persistent Public-Chance Schedules14 Aug 2026
- 2025Beyond Outcome-Based Imperfect-Recall: Higher-Resolution Abstractions for Imperfect-Information Games16 Oct 2025
- 2025Meta-Learning in Self-Play Regret Minimization26 Apr 2025
- 2023Accelerating Nash Equilibrium Convergence in Monte Carlo Settings Through Counterfactual Value Based Fictitious Play4 Sep 2023
- 2023Learning not to Regret2 Mar 2023
- 2022Efficient Phi-Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games via Online Mirror Descent30 May 2022
- 2022Sample-Efficient Learning of Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games15 May 2022
- 2022Near-Optimal Learning of Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information3 Feb 2022