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Nash Convergence of Gradient Dynamics in Iterated General-Sum Games

arXiv 1301.3892 ↗First posted 16 Jan 2013cs.GTcited by 18

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Abstract (arXiv)

Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of computationally simple agents an appealing direction. In this work, we analyze the behavior of agents that incrementally adapt their strategy through gradient ascent on expected payoff, in the simple setting of two-player, two-action, iterated general-sum games, and present a surprising result. We show that either the agents will converge to Nash equilibrium, or if the strategies themselves do not converge, then their average payoffs will nevertheless converge to the payoffs of a Nash equilibrium.

Key facts. Cited by 18 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 16 Jan 2013.

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Citing papers per year: 2021: 8; 2022: 2; 2023: 4; 2024: 2; 2025: 2.

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