Groupwise Distortion Guarantees for Preference-Based Alignment

Preference-based alignment methods such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF) aggregate pairwise preferences to learn an LLM policy, but a natural goal is maximizing social welfare (average cardinal utility), which comparisons alone need not identify. G"olz, Haghtalab, and Yang (GHY) measure the gap by distortion: the worst-case ratio between the welfare of the best fixed lottery (distribution over responses) and of the learned lottery. They show NLHF is optimal when every user receives the same lottery. Account-based LLMs, however, have information about their users and can serve different lotteries to different people. We give an efficient algorithm, GLHF, that learns a single group-conditioned policy from one comparison per user. Under individual Bradley--Terry comparisons, GLHF asymptotically matches GHY's optimal population distortion bound simultaneously on every group in a prespecified, possibly overlapping collection, with sample complexity growing logarithmically in the number of groups and inversely with the smallest group mass. A sharper guarantee for groups with similar preferences approaches distortion of one when members share a feasible favorite response. In experiments using human coffee ratings and synthetic LLM-generated ratings, GLHF lowers distortion in every evaluated group and substantially reduces worst-group distortion relative to NLHF and other group-agnostic baselines.