Monitorability Disposition in Large Reasoning Models
On the map: LLM reasoning → Reasoning for agents, planning and code also fits: Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning
Abstract (arXiv)
Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of large reasoning models (LRMs) is a common way to detect misbehavior in real-world practice. However, current monitoring is passive: a separate model inspects the session only after execution. This means harm may already have occurred before it is caught. An active alternative is to have the model self-report its misbehavior as it happens. Whether models are willing to do this, however, is unknown. We introduce "monitorability disposition": a model's willingness to make itself monitorable and stay monitored throughout inference when warranted. We measure it as the fraction of warranted cases in which a model self-reports its own misbehavior via tool calls to available monitoring channels. We evaluate four LRMs on three misbehaviors (sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias) while varying the available monitors (AI and human) and the pressure to use the monitoring tools. We find that when tool use is optional, models self-report in only about 16% of warranted cases on average. Increasing tool-use pressure does not improve reporting where it matters: high-severity misbehavior is never self-reported. Models also systematically select the monitor they perceive as least strict. Overall, we identify monitorability disposition as a new contributing factor to model monitorability: when sufficiently strong, it keeps models seeking monitorability throughout inference.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning. Builds on 38 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Oct 2026.
Builds on
38 of 41 references.
References · 38
- 2025gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Cardcited by 1,386
- 2023Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Promptingcited by 1,122
- 2023Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Modelscited by 1,040
- 2026DeepSeek-V4: Towards Highly Efficient Million-Token Context Intelligencecited by 1,040
- 2023Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoningcited by 703
- 2026Kimi K2.5: Visual Agentic Intelligencecited by 501
- 2025Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Thinkcited by 415
- 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
- 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
- 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 287
- 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetycited by 249
- 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 229
26 more
- 2024Sycophancy to Subterfuge: Investigating Reward-Tampering in Large Language Modelscited by 178
- 2023Time Travel in LLMs: Tracing Data Contamination in Large Language Modelscited by 177
- 2025Chain-of-Thought Reasoning In The Wild Is Not Always Faithfulcited by 170
- 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threatscited by 158
- 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 145
- 2025Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RLcited by 136
- 2025Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluatedcited by 128
- 2025When Chain of Thought is Necessary, Language Models Struggle to Evade Monitorscited by 88
- 2025Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Trainingcited by 86
- 2026Emergent Introspective Awareness in Large Language Modelscited by 82
- 2025School of Reward Hacks: Hacking harmless tasks generalizes to misaligned behavior in LLMscited by 66
- 2025Monitoring Monitorabilitycited by 58
- 2025CoT Red-Handed: Stress Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitoringcited by 54
- 2023Data Contamination Quiz: A Tool to Detect and Estimate Contamination in Large Language Modelscited by 47
- 2025Large language models can learn and generalize steganographic chain-of-thought under process supervisioncited by 32
- 2025Reliable Weak-to-Strong Monitoring of LLM Agentscited by 31
- 2026Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thoughtcited by 25
- 2025Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMscited by 22
- 2025Can Reasoning Models Obfuscate Reasoning? Stress-Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitorabilitycited by 22
- 2025Training LLMs for Honesty via Confessionscited by 22
- 2025Async Control: Stress-testing Asynchronous Control Measures for LLM Agentscited by 22
- 2025Spilling the Beans: Teaching LLMs to Self-Report Their Hidden Objectivescited by 15
- 2025Output Supervision Can Obfuscate the Chain of Thoughtcited by 13
- 2025Practical challenges of control monitoring in frontier AI deploymentscited by 8
- 2026Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehaviorcited by 6
- 2026Intent Laundering: AI Safety Datasets Are Not What They Seemcited by 3
Built on by
Not cited yet.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Investigating CoT Monitorability in Large Reasoning Models
- 2026Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Can Be Unreliable in Implicit-Influence Settings
- 2025Measuring Chain-of-Thought Monitorability Through Faithfulness and Verbosity
- 2026MonitorBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Chain-of-Thought Monitorability in Large Language Models
- 2026Does Out-of-Sight Equal Out-of-Mind in CoT Monitorability?
- 2025The Ends Justify the Thoughts: RL-Induced Motivated Reasoning in LLM CoTs
- 2026Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation
- 2025A Pragmatic Way to Measure Chain-of-Thought Monitorability