Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Can Be Unreliable in Implicit-Influence Settings
On the map: LLM reasoning → Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning
Abstract (arXiv)
Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is increasingly treated as an important safety layer for frontier reasoning models. Most monitorability evaluations study explicit-influence settings: setups where the prompt directly incentivizes the model to hide something, e.g., by instructing it to perform a hidden side-task. A complementary axis for CoT-monitor evaluations is implicit-influence settings, where the prompt contains no instruction to hide, but the model's behavior is still shaped by features of the task or context, e.g. an irrelevant detail about a candidate that biases a hiring rating. We introduce the first benchmark that directly compares CoT monitorability under the two regimes. We test how model behavior changes in the presence of a nudge to choose a particular option. The nudge is delivered either as a casual aside (implicit), or as a direct instruction to act on the nudge and to conceal having done so (explicit). The benchmark spans four task formats (binary choice, numeric rating, multiple-choice QA, open-ended coding) and seven frontier extended-thinking models. Under explicit influence, a CoT monitor detects 60-94% of behavior shifts: even models instructed to conceal it leak the instruction into their CoT. Under implicit influence, the same factors still shift behavior, but detection falls by 41-46 percentage points in two of our four settings. Realistic system-prompt additions (of the kind a developer might deploy to reduce off-topic bias) lower implicit detection further, to as low as 5%, while preserving the behavioral influence itself. These results suggest that monitorability estimates obtained in explicit-influence settings may over-estimate monitorability, and that monitorability can be further decreased by well-intentioned deployment choices. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/agatha-duzan/implicit-vs-explicit-influence
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning. Builds on 26 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Aug 2026.
Builds on
26 of 35 references.
Closest ancestors · 14
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Noticing the Watcher: LLM Agents Can Infer CoT Monitoring from Blocking Feedback14 Mar
- 2026Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought5 Mar
- 2025Monitoring Monitorability20 Dec
- 2025Can Reasoning Models Obfuscate Reasoning? Stress-Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitorability21 Oct
- 2025LLMs Can Covertly Sandbag on Capability Evaluations Against Chain-of-Thought Monitoring31 Jul
- 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety15 Jul
- 2025When Chain of Thought is Necessary, Language Models Struggle to Evade Monitors7 Jul
- 2025Large language models can learn and generalize steganographic chain-of-thought under process supervision2 Jun
- 2025CoT Red-Handed: Stress Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitoring29 May
- 2025Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think8 May
- 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation14 Mar
- 2025Chain-of-Thought Reasoning In The Wild Is Not Always Faithful11 Mar
2 more
Other references · 12
- 2023GPQA: A Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmarkcited by 2,748
- 2024MMLU-Pro: A More Robust and Challenging Multi-Task Language Understanding Benchmarkcited by 1,758
- 2023Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Additioncited by 1,009
- 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 824
- 2025Humanity's Last Examcited by 467
- 2025Are DeepSeek R1 And Other Reasoning Models More Faithful?cited by 69
- 2025SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agentscited by 58
- 2025Teaching Models to Verbalize Reward Hacking in Chain-of-Thought Reasoningcited by 19
- 2026How does information access affect LLM monitors' ability to detect sabotage?cited by 12
- 2026Biases in the Blind Spot: Detecting What LLMs Fail to Mentioncited by 8
- 2026Censored LLMs as a Natural Testbed for Secret Knowledge Elicitationcited by 5
- 2026Value Leakage: An LLM's Answers Are Silently Shaped by Its Own Valuescited by 3
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Bypassing the Rationale: Causal Auditing of Implicit Reasoning in Language Models
- 2025Measuring Chain-of-Thought Monitorability Through Faithfulness and Verbosity
- 2026Does Out-of-Sight Equal Out-of-Mind in CoT Monitorability?
- 2025A Pragmatic Way to Measure Chain-of-Thought Monitorability
- 2026From Decorative to Load-Bearing: Task Difficulty Shapes the Causal Role of Chain-of-Thought
- 2026MonitorBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Chain-of-Thought Monitorability in Large Language Models
- 2026The Fragility of Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Across Typologically Diverse Languages
- 2025Investigating CoT Monitorability in Large Reasoning Models