Options, Not Clicks: Lattice Refinement for Consent-Driven MCP Authorization
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
As Model Context Protocol adoption grows, securing tool invocations via meaningful user consent has become a critical challenge, as existing methods, broad always allow toggles or opaque LLM-based decisions, fail to account for dangerous call arguments and often lead to consent fatigue. In this work, we present Conleash, a client-side middleware that enforces boundary-scoped authorization by utilizing a risk lattice to auto-permit safe calls within known boundaries while escalating risks, a policy engine for user-defined invariants, and a refinement loop that converts user decisions into reusable rules. Evaluated on 984 real-world traces, Conleash achieved 98.2% accuracy, caught 99.4% of escalations, and added only 8.2 ms of overhead for policy verification; furthermore, in a user study where N=16, participants significantly preferred Conleash scoped permissions over traditional methods, citing higher trust and reduced prompting.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 50 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 May 2026.
Builds on
8 of 50 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2025QuadSentinel: Sequent Safety for Machine-Checkable Control in Multi-agent Systems18 Dec
- 2025When Refusals Fail: Unstable Safety Mechanisms in Long-Context LLM Agents2 Dec
- 2025Secure and Efficient Access Control for Computer-Use Agents via Context Space26 Sep
- 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems8 Mar
Other references · 4
- 2019(Un)informed Consent: Studying GDPR Consent Notices in the Fieldcited by 23
- 2025VeriSafe Agent: Safeguarding Mobile GUI Agent via Logic-based Action Verificationcited by 20
- 2015Android Permissions Remystified: A Field Study on Contextual Integritycited by 15
- 2025Breaking the illusion: Automated Reasoning of GDPR Consent Violationscited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agentscited by 4
- 2026Towards an Agent Operating System - Lessons from Classical and Cloud OScited by 0
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?cited by 0
- 2026When Consent Outlives Context: Residual Authority Replay in Long-Lived Agentscited by 0
- 2026When Consent Outlives Context: Residual Authority Replay in Long-Lived Agents27 Sep 2026
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?27 Aug 2026
- 2026Towards an Agent Operating System - Lessons from Classical and Cloud OS27 Jul 2026
- 2026Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agents26 Jul 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Give Them an Inch and They Will Take a Mile:Understanding and Measuring Caller Identity Confusion in MCP-Based AI Systems
- 2026ACLE-MCP: Attested Capability Leases for Execution-Time Trust in Remote LLM Tool Use
- 2026Palette: A Modular, Controllable, and Efficient Framework for On-demand Authorized Safety Alignment Relaxation in LLMs
- 2026Zero-Trust Authorization and Discovery for Enterprise MCP
- 2026The Claws in Plain Sight: Unauthorized Context Disclosure through LLM Agent Tool Calls
- 2025MiniScope: A Least Privilege Framework for Authorizing Tool Calling Agents
- 2026Capability Gates Are Not Authorization: Confused-Deputy Failures in LLM Agent Frameworks
- 2026Beyond the Prompt: Jailbreaking Function-Calling LLMs via Simulated Moderation Traces