mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Anticipatory Human Oversight of Agentic AI: A Philosophical Account

arXiv 2609.24242 ↗First posted 21 Sep 2026cs.CYcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance also fits: General LLM agent frameworks and benchmarks

Abstract (arXiv)

Human oversight is widely held to mitigate the risks of AI systems. Even for systems that produce discrete outputs at identifiable decision points, the realisation of human oversight as a reactive measure is empirically fragile, yet increasingly well understood. However, for agentic AI -- systems that plan, decompose goals, and execute multi-step actions over extended horizons -- reactive oversight reaches its structural limits: intervention on individual actions defeats the autonomy that motivates the deployment, while intervention on aggregate patterns is too coarse for harms whose cumulative consequences only become legible after the fact. This paper argues that reactive oversight must be complemented by an anticipatory mode: oversight exercised before the agent acts, by specifying the normative agenda that structures the space of permissible action and refining it iteratively through specification, runtime, and inspection. The two are complements -- the agenda's escalation conditions specify when reactive intervention is invoked. Drawing on Meaningful Human Control, we read anticipatory oversight as the operationalisation of distal-reason tracking. In addition, we argue that the proposed framework yields a specific responsibility architecture by design: occupying the anticipatory mode is the discharge of a role-grounded prospective obligation, and backward-looking responsibility takes the form of strict moral answerability -- rationalistic, relational, and holding regardless of fault, in virtue of the principal's prior opportunity for precaution. We develop bridging failure modes, address objections including moral luck and the illusion of control, and close with regulatory, architectural, and empirical implications

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 78 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Sep 2026.

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16 of 78 references.

References · 16

  1. 2020Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignmentcited by 443
  2. 2024The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistantscited by 103
  3. 2024Visibility into AI Agentscited by 77
  4. 2021The Flaws of Policies Requiring Human Oversight of Government Algorithmscited by 44
  5. 2025Fully Autonomous AI Agents Should Not be Developedcited by 43
  6. 2025Characterizing AI Agents for Alignment and Governancecited by 30
  7. 2024On the Quest for Effectiveness in Human Oversight: Interdisciplinary Perspectivescited by 28
  8. 2025Discerning What Matters: A Multi-Dimensional Assessment of Moral Competence in LLMscited by 10
  9. 2025Automation Bias in the AI Act: On the Legal Implications of Attempting to De-Bias Human Oversight of AIcited by 7
  10. 2025Agentic AI and Multiagentic: Are We Reinventing the Wheel?cited by 5
  11. 2026Breaking Up with Normatively Monolithic Agency with GRACE: A Reason-Based Neuro-Symbolic Architecture for Safe and Ethical AI Alignmentcited by 5
  12. 2025Disentangling AI Alignment: A Structured Taxonomy Beyond Safety and Ethicscited by 3
4 more
  1. 2025Design Considerations for Human Oversight of AI: Insights from Co-Design Workshops and Work Design Theorycited by 2
  2. 2026Keeping an Eye on AI: A Framework for Effective Human Oversight of AI Systemscited by 2
  3. 2026Constitutive vs. Corrective: A Causal Taxonomy of Human Runtime Involvement in AI Systemscited by 1
  4. 2026Position: AI Safety Requires Effective Controllabilitycited by 1

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  3. 2026Autonomy and Agency in Agentic AI: Architectural Tactics for Regulated Contexts
  4. 2026Oversight Has a Capacity: Calibrating Agent Guards to a Subjective, Fatiguing Human
  5. 2026Human Control Is the Anchor, Not the Answer: Early Divergence of Oversight in Agentic AI Communities
  6. 2025The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an AI Agent's Safety and Autonomy
  7. 2026A pragmatic approach to regulating AI agents
  8. 2026Delegation Without Living Governance